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Abstract 
The amount of information a person can store for a certain time is highly limited. This 
limitation is known as the capacity of working memory (WM). The average capacity in 
the visual domain is assumed to be around four items. However, several studies found 
WM capacity to vary substantially among healthy young adults. The main aim of the 
current work was to disentangle causes underlying individual differences in WM. In five 
experiments we explored whether individual variations in WM are reflective of 
differences in selective attention.  
The main purpose of Experiments 1 and 2 was to evaluate whether individuals with high 
and low WM capacity differ in the efficiency and speed of allocating attention on targets. 
We realized different versions of a cued categorization task in which different types of 
attention control were necessary, a more automatically triggered allocation of attention 
and a voluntary initiation of attention engagement. We further manipulated the inter-
stimulus interval (SOA) between cue display and target presentation in order to look for 
differences in the latency of attention control. The results revealed that participants with 
low WM capacity were less effective in engaging voluntary attention control processes 
and they were also slower in doing so compared to high WM capacity individuals 
(Experiments 1 and 2). However, all trials were presented in a mixed order, so that for 
each trial the appropriate attention control processes have to be coordinated and 
constantly adapted in correspondence to the current task demands. This requires 
coordinating changing task demands according to the current task set – a cognitive 
process which is called cognitive flexibility – such as engaging attention onto targets. 
When the trial structure did not require such coordination processes (like on single 
blocks) smaller individual differences related to variations in WM capacity in the time 
dependent efficiency of voluntary attention control were found (Experiment 2). The 
interpretation that individual variations in WM capacity might not exclusively depend on 
the voluntary engagement of attention but also on the efficiency of cognitive flexibility 
was supported by further results of Experiment 1 revealing a relationship between WM 
capacity and indices of executive control, in particular solving competition between 
various processing requirements. Thus, individual variations in WM capacity seem to be 
related to the ability to orient attention and to flexibly coordinate the competition between 
changing task demands. 
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We further developed this idea by investigating how the ability to orient attention and the 
efficiency to reconfigure task sets both contribute to optimal WM functioning. As WM 
has a very limited online capacity it is of considerable importance for the individual to 
control how many, and which, items are encoded into WM, a process known as gating. 
One way of testing the effect of gating on WM capacity is to implement distractor-present 
trials in a change detection paradigm. Although gating is typically considered to be 
reflective of selective attention, we believed gating to be a function of both the ability to 
coordinate and reconfigure changing task demands and selective attention, respectively. 
That is, the trial structure in a change detection paradigm with distractors added typically 
demands the coordination of two different task sets and individuals need to continuously 
switch back and forth between tasks where all items, or only a subset of items (distractor-
present trials), are targets. In order to examine whether effective gating is a function of 
processes associated with the efficiency of cognitive flexibility and selective attention we 
tried to disentangle both processes in some of the trials. In the standard change detection 
task with distractor-present trials the actual task set can first be identified when the-to-be 
memorized stimuli are present. Only at this point participants are able to discriminate 
between trials where selection processes are relevant or not. Thus, the timing of task set 
reconfiguration strongly depends on the distractors’ presence itself and its detection. In 
Experiments 3 to 5, we aided task set reconfiguration processes by displaying the cue in 
the target color, indicating that distractors would be present, while in other trials, the cue 
did not reveal the current task set. In Experiments 4 and 5 we additionally realized single 
distractor-present blocks. Overall, participants with low WM capacity performed better in 
distractor-present trials when the task set could be anticipated in advance either due to the 
predictive task set cue or due to task context (single distractor blocks). Furthermore, and 
more importantly, the magnitude of this improvement and the efficiency of early selection 
mechanisms were both associated with the amount of available cognitive resources 
(Experiment 3 vs. Experiment 4).  
Taken together, our results of this work contribute to a deeper understanding of the nature 
of individual differences in WM. Collectively, our findings suggests that there is a tight 
relationship between attention and WM, which is associated with a broad class of 
cognitive processes, reflecting the diverse modes of operation within each of these 
systems. The amount of consumed processing resources and the ability to resolve 
conflicts between competing processes seem to be important characteristics in this
XXIII 
 
 
 
multifaceted relationship. Consequently, optimal WM functioning for low WM capacity 
individuals might be achieved by telling individuals on what process they should allocate 
resources to. 
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Part 1 
Working Memory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction into Working Memory 
1.1 The Concept of Working Memory 
In our daily life we need to keep certain pieces of information in mind until the 
opportunity to use them arrives. Typical situations are for example going for grocery 
shopping with a shopping list in mind, remembering a phone number until dialing it or 
working out a tip in one’s head in a restaurant. Another common example is reading 
comprehension. In order to understand a sentence, one must hold the beginning of a 
sentence in mind and continuously put its fragments together while reading the rest of a 
text. In all these situations, it is essential to hold previous information active and process 
new information simultaneously. Working memory (WM) is the system responsible for 
this. It is a key cognitive function that enables us to temporarily maintain information in 
an accessible state so that it may be manipulated and further processed (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974). WM is widely assumed to be an important contributor to essential functions 
in human cognition. Many higher cognitive processes rely on WM whenever they require 
information to be kept “online” or to be manipulated.  
The concept of a memory system that is responsible for the temporary storage of 
information is not new. The first notion of such a memory system dates back to the 19
th
 
century. Since then, views on its nature and function have constantly evolved and 
changed from a relatively passive short-term memory (STM) store to a dynamic WM 
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system (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; James, 1980; G. Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). 
“In contrast to the traditional storage-orientated notion of STM, WM is considered as a 
more processing-orientated construct […] in which active processing and temporary 
storage dynamically take place” (Shah & Miyake, 1999, pp. 8). Thus, WM reflects more 
than temporary maintenance. It includes other processing mechanisms that help to make 
use of STM (Cowan, 2008). However, there is no clear-cut distinction between WM and 
STM (Postle, 2006; Zimmer, 2008). In fact, STM can be defined as a subcomponent 
within the theoretical construct of WM responsible for the storage of information. From 
this view, it is not much a debate about different memory systems, but rather than the use 
of distinct terms when looking at mechanisms underlying the maintenance of information. 
Since the current work is focusing on differences in nature of WM storage, no 
dissociation between WM and STM will be made. 
A fundamental characteristic of WM is its apparent limitation in capacity. In the visual 
domain, WM storage capacity is usually assumed to vary between three to four objects 
(Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Zhang & Luck, 2008). Despite this general limit on 
central capacity, substantial individual differences can be observed across different 
subject populations. It is well-known that WM capacity declines in people with advanced 
age (Brockmole & Logie, 2013; Brockmole, Parra, Della Sala, & Logie, 2008) or in 
adults with a variety of cognitive disorders like schizophrenia (J. Lee & Park, 2005) or 
Parkinson’s disorder (E. Y. Lee et al., 2010). Even within a healthy adult population, 
studies reveal reliable individual differences in estimates of WM capacity (Cowan et al., 
2005; Fukuda, Awh, & Vogel, 2010; Talsma, Slagter, Nieuwenhuis, Hage, & Kok, 2005). 
Such individual differences in WM performance have been interpreted as important stable 
traits because they are strongly correlated with various measures of higher cognitive 
functioning (Engle, 2010; Perez & Vogel, 2011) including fluid intelligence (Cowan et 
al., 2005; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; 
Fukuda, Vogel, Mayr, & Awh, 2010; Heitz, Unsworth, & Engle, 2004). Consequently, it 
is important to better understand the nature of differences in WM and the focus of the 
current work is to characterize possible sources for the variation in WM capacity in 
healthy young adults. 
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1.2 The Unitary vs. Non-Unitary Nature of Working Memory 
In WM literature there is an ongoing controversy about the nature of WM. Some 
researchers have emphasized that WM is fractionated in different components (e.g. 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) while others conceive WM as a unitary system that is 
independent of the nature of its content (Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004; Cowan, 
1999; Engle et al., 1999; Oberauer, 2013). According to the first view, WM can be 
dissociated into two distinct memory stores, one for visual and one for verbal or auditory 
information (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Thus, interference between processing and 
storage are assumed to occur when involving information that affects the same domain 
(e.g., when they both include verbal or visual information). For instance, studies 
examining brain-damaged patients revealed that the functioning of verbal WM can be 
disrupted with intact functioning of visual WM and vice versa (De Renzi & Nichelli, 
1975). Further support for the subdivision into visual and verbal WM comes from dual-
task studies showing little or no interference on visual WM when the secondary task 
included processing of verbal material and vice versa. However, substantial impacts on 
the main task have been found for two tasks using only visual or verbal stimuli (Beech, 
1984; Scarborough, 1972). Together, this has been taken as evidence for a functional 
division between verbal and visual WM processing. 
Other accounts go even further and fractionate WM into finer parts. For instance, visual 
WM can further be subdivided into visual and spatial WM. One source of evidence for a 
dissociating memory for visual and spatial information is provided by dual-task 
techniques. These kinds of experiments have shown that a concurrent spatial task 
interferes with spatial memory performance and a concurrent visual task with visual 
memory performance. For visual memory performance, however, there was no 
interference from a secondary spatial task and vice versa (Tresch, Sinnamon, & Seamon, 
1993; Woodman & Luck, 2004; Woodman, Vogel, & Luck, 2001). Brain imaging studies 
with brain-damaged patients also highlight the possibility to disrupt spatial memory 
without influencing visual memory, or vice versa (e.g. Farah, Hammond, Levine, & 
Calvanio, 1988). Further evidence comes from single-unit activity recordings in monkeys, 
whereas neural activity during the retention interval was found in different cortical areas 
for spatial and visual information (e.g. Gnadt & Andersen, 1988; E. K. Miller, Li, & 
Desimone, 1993). Comparable results have been revealed in human neuroimaging studies 
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of healthy adults using EEG techniques (e.g. Mecklinger & Pfeifer, 1996; Ruchkin, 
Johnson, Grafman, Canoune, & Ritter, 1997) or fMRI (e.g. Belger et al., 1998). 
However, there is also conflicting evidence that does not support a subdivision of visual 
memory into visual and spatial subsystems. In particular, visual memory performance 
declines in conditions with task-irrelevant changes in object locations suggesting that 
context information is important for visual WM (Jiang, Olson, & Chun, 2000; Zimmer & 
Lehnert, 2006). For example, Zimmer and Lehnert (2006) have shown that WM 
performance for shapes declines, when the spatial configuration is disrupted. This was 
even the case when the names of the shapes rather than the actual shapes were tested. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to propose that visual and spatial information are both actively 
integrated into single item representations whenever this is useful to solve a given task. 
Changes in spatial positions would thus reduce the accessibility to the integrated item 
representation. Moreover, the change in spatial configuration might produce a change 
signal which is difficult to ignore. To conclude, spatial and visual WM might be either 
dissociated or integrated, resulting in different degrees of functional overlap, depending 
on how they are measured. Furthermore, since object identities are naturally integrated 
within a spatial position (Treisman & Zhang, 2006), spatial and visual information are at 
least to some extent linked in visual WM (see Luck, 2008 for a similiar discussion).  
Although there is accumulated evidence for a subdivision of WM into different systems, 
there is also conflicting evidence speaking against such dissociation. For instance, 
D’Esposito et al. (1998) found overlaps in brain areas activated by verbal and visuo-
spatial memory. It has further been shown that a task that is assumed to assess auditory 
WM also activates brain areas associated with perception and language, areas which 
should tap into visual and verbal WM (Gabrieli, Poldrack, & Desmond, 1998). Behavioral 
studies further demonstrate that verbal memory is disrupted by visuo-spatial processing 
and vice versa (Barrouillet, Bernardin, Portrat, Vergauwe, & Camos, 2007; Phillips & 
Christie, 1977). Further evidence that supports a unitary memory view is that different 
memory tasks tapping into verbal or visual processes are highly correlated (e.g. 
Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle, 2009). Such results cannot be explained 
from a WM subsystem point of view that is why this conclusion remains controversial in 
WM literature. Several researchers oppose the view of different WM systems and focus 
on the unitary nature of a single WM system (Barrouillet et al., 2004; Cowan, 1999; 
Engle et al., 1999; Oberauer, 2013). Instead, they emphasize a more functional role of 
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WM, independent of the nature of its content. They define WM as a continuous process 
based on the general availability of resources together with a mechanism of resource 
sharing. From this view, processing and storage would compete for domain-general 
limited resources resulting in interference whenever processing and storage has to be 
performed simultaneously (Barrouillet et al., 2007). A common conceptualization of the 
unitary memory view characterizes WM as the selected part of representations that are 
currently under the focus of attention (e.g., Cowan, 1999).  
Taken together, a variety of WM theories proposed earlier reflect distinct characteristics 
on the nature and function of WM. In the current work we ourselves take the view that 
WM is best characterized from a functional point of view, and the question whether WM 
is based on a single mental resource or multiple subsystems is only tangential to the topic 
of the current work. Thus, although the current work focuses on WM tasks in the visual 
domain, we assume that our results are reflective of WM functioning overall. 
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2 Assessing Working Memory Functioning 
2.1 Variety of Working Memory Tasks 
Over the last 30 years various indicators have been developed to measure WM capacity. 
These tasks differ in their cognitive demands on the WM system and therefore provide 
different perspectives on the cognitive processes of WM functioning. Probably, the best 
known and most frequently used tasks for measuring WM can be divided into three 
different classes: span tasks, continuous performance tasks and visual array tasks which 
are described in the following. 
Span tasks are one classic measure of WM capacity and can be further subdivided into 
simple and complex span tasks. Typically, simple span tasks measure the passive storage 
function of WM. In these tasks, participants are required to temporarily maintain a series 
of sequentially presented elements. Afterwards, the stimuli have to be recalled in the 
correct displayed order. For example, in the visuo-spatial version of this task named the 
“Corsi block-tapping task”, participants have to reproduce spatial locations. By contrast, 
complex span tasks (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) reflect the idea that WM functioning 
combines passive storage as well as active processing. They are created by adding a 
demanding secondary processing task to a simple span task after each to-be-remembered 
stimulus. This secondary task thus competes for resources with passive information 
storage. For the most popular variations known as operation span and symmetry span (a 
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visuo-spatial variant) the secondary task is the solving of a mathematical equation or the 
judgement whether a picture is symmetrical or not. 
The n-back task is a continuous performance task (Kirchner, 1958). Participants are 
presented with a sequence of stimuli and instructed to continuously monitor and update 
the to-be-remembered information. Their task is to judge whether the currently displayed 
stimulus matches the item presented n trials before. With increasing n, task difficulty 
increases, because more items have to be kept active in order to make the correct 
comparison. Therefore, the n-back task is assumed to measure active WM functioning. 
The displayed information has to be kept active and needs to be updated continuously. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Example of a change detection 
paradigm adapted from Luck and Vogel, 
(2013). Displayed is a change trial. 
 
Visual array tasks present multiple pieces of visuo-spatial information in parallel. They 
are typically assessed to measure the passive maintenance component of WM. A 
conventional version is the change detection task, which has been introduced by Phillips 
(1974) and promoted by Luck and Vogel (1997). A typical change detection task 
procedure is depicted in Figure 2.1. In this paradigm participants briefly study a set of 
objects on a memory array. After a brief retention interval or delay period, usually 
around one second, a test array appears and memory is tested. In 50% of the trials one 
object has changed relative to the memory array and on the remaining trials the test array 
is identical. Participants have to judge whether a change has occurred or not. In the 
present work, we will focus on WM capacity as it is reflected in change detection tasks. 
Advantages of the change detection task a measurement of WM functioning will be 
discussed in the following. 
2 Assessing Working Memory Functioning | 9 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Advantages of Using a Change Detection Task as 
Measurement of Working Memory Functioning 
The change detection task is commonly seen as a process-pure reflection of passive 
storage and much of the evidence for storage-based functioning of WM has been assessed 
with it (Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007; Cowan et al., 2005; Fukuda, Vogel, et al., 2010; 
Luck & Vogel, 1997; for a review see Luck, 2008). It is a fairly straightforward measure 
that involves less non-mnemonic processes during task performance than, for example, 
the operation span task or continuous performance task, making it a sensitive measure of 
WM storage only. 
One major advantage of using change detection tasks is that the role of other non-
mnemonic processes related to task-general processing can be easily minimized. 
Perceptual influences during the memory and test array can be controlled for by using 
simple and highly discriminable stimuli and by realizing big changes between memory 
and test array to facilitate the detection of a change (Awh et al., 2007; Fukuda, Vogel, et 
al., 2010). Secondly, influences of the response system are controlled for by using a 
simple “change”/”no-change” response without stressing for speed. Perhaps the biggest 
advantage of using a change detection task is the fact that during retrieval it is only 
necessary to compare the memory representations with a new set of stimuli. There is no 
need to manipulate or transform the retained information as there is in complex span tasks 
or continuous performance task. In complex span tasks, for example, the necessity to 
retrieve the stored items in a serial order might cause response interference, whereby 
reporting the first item might interfere the representations of the remaining information. 
As a consequence, WM capacity would be underestimated because fewer items can be 
reproduced than without interference. Taken together, since performance in change 
detection tasks is less prone to the influence of task-general processes like response 
interference it is an effective measurement for WM capacity (for a similar discussion see 
Luck, 2008). 
A further advantage is the simplicity of the task. It is easy to adapt to the examination of 
various research questions and consequently a wide variety of approaches have been 
developed around this design. For example, within the framework of a change detection 
task, individual differences in WM capacity have been assessed by varying the number of 
presented stimuli (e.g. Luck & Vogel, 1997). Furthermore, one can investigate how 
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information is represented in WM by changing the type of stimuli (e.g. Alvarez & 
Cavanagh, 2004; Luck & Vogel, 1997), the quality of item representations can be 
measured by manipulating the magnitude of change (Awh et al., 2007; Zhang & Luck, 
2008), the time course of consolidation processes in WM can be estimated by displaying 
pattern masks shortly after the memory array (e.g. Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2006), 
presenting relevant objects together with distractors allows to measure modulations of 
selective attention on WM (e.g. Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005), etc. Since the 
current work aimed to examine selective attention effects on WM and estimate individual 
differences in WM capacity, the change detection task was an advantageous measurement 
for WM storage. 
One major issue in visual WM research is the question whether subjects store objects as 
visual objects or verbal labels. It is possible that participants form mental lists of verbal 
labels for the presented stimuli. From this perspective, performance in change detection 
tasks might not reflect purely visual storage processes but entail contributions of verbal 
WM. As introduced in Chapter 1.2 the nature of WM is still controversial and some 
researchers emphasize the importance of controlling for influences of verbal and visual 
WM. Luck and Vogel (1997), however, showed that verbal WM does not impact 
performance in a visual change detection task. In half of the trials verbal load conditions 
were added before the presentation of the memory array. Participants were required to 
hold and say digits presented at the beginning of the trial until the end of a trial. They 
compared performance on such trials with trials without verbal load and found no 
significant difference in performance. This has been taken as evidence that performance 
in change detection task is not influenced by verbal WM and reflects process-pure 
estimates of visual WM. 
 
2.3 Estimating Storage Capacity of Visual Working Memory 
Visual WM is generally considered to have small storage capacity. In order to quantify its 
upper capacity limit, researchers typically varied the number of presented stimuli within 
an array – set sizes (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997). 
The logic of varying the number of stimuli is that participants would perform perfectly 
whenever their memory capacity of K items would be less than or equal to the number of 
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presented items (N). When N > K, the likelihood that the item displayed in the test array is 
actually one of those represented in WM, and hence, that the participants are able to make 
an accurate decision, is simply K/N. On the remaining (1-K)/N trials, where the target 
stimulus is not stored due to the capacity limitation, a person would not know whether a 
change occurred or not and guess. Thus, performance should decrease continuously as N 
exceeds K. For example, if a participant’s actual capacity is two items and the presented 
set size is four, the probability that a change is detected is 0.5. This probability would 
further decline with increasing set size. If the number of items which are required to be 
maintained is six, the detection probability for the same participant would be 0.3 only. 
This general logic was taken into account when Pashler (1988) formulated an equation for 
estimating a person’s visual WM capacity. Importantly, he corrected for guessing by 
incorporating hit rates (H) and false alarms (F) in the equation. This index of WM 
capacity was further improved by Cowan (2001), and the resulting formula is the 
following: K=N(H-F), whereas K represents the assessed WM capacity. In the present 
work hit rates refer to proportion of correct match trials whereas false alarms are the 
proportion of incorrect change-trials. Response misses were declared as errors.  
The validity of the K-Score as index of WM capacity has been shown in several 
experiments. In these experiments, independently of stimulus type and set size, the 
estimated upper limitation of WM capacity was quite constantly reached at about three to 
four items (Fukuda & Vogel, 2009; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). 
However, it is not yet clear whether this capacity limit is due to a fixed amount of high 
resolution item representations or “slots” (Cowan et al., 2005; Luck & Vogel, 1997; 
Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001) that can be retained in WM or due to the total amount 
of information, independently of the number of items (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Bays, 
Catalao, & Husain, 2009; Bays & Husain, 2008). Although arbitrating between these 
views is a fundamental question for theories on how information is stored on WM, we 
will not go further into detail about the nature of WM (for a deeper discussion see Luck, 
2008). In the present project, we interpreted the K-score as number of objects stored in 
WM with a fixed resolution.  
The Pashler-Cowan K formula, however, only accurately estimates a person’s WM 
capacity when being applied to above-capacity set sizes. Per definition, a person’s WM 
index can only be as high as the largest set size realized. That is, imagine a person’s 
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actual WM capacity is K=4 items. Accuracy in a change detection task with set size one 
and three would be perfect, resulting in a corresponding K-score of K=1 and K=3 items, 
respectively. Both estimates, however, would be underestimating the actual WM capacity 
of K=4 items. Therefore, in order to accurately estimate a person’s actual WM capacity 
the realized set size in a change detection paradigm must exceed its WM capacities. Since 
a priori we could not know a person’s capacity, subjects completed different set sizes in 
the present work. We computed K at these set sizes and took the maximum K across set 
sizes to estimate a person’s WM capacity in the respective experiments. Thus, our 
assessed WM capacity scores can be interpreted as a true reflection of WM storage 
functioning. To test for effects of set size, mean accuracies for each set size corrected for 
guessing (H-F), the so called PR-Score, has been used. 
 
2.4 Neurophysiological Measures of Visual Working Memory 
Behavioral experiments have shown a general limit in visual WM storage. To better 
understand how the storage process works, visual WM can also be examined at a neural 
level. A variety of neurophysiological approaches have been extensively assessed in the 
extent to which they measure WM load and many of the recent findings are built on 
electrophysiological correlates of WM (see Drew, McCollough, & Vogel, 2006 for a 
similar discussion). Such event-related potentials (ERPs) are typically extracted time 
locked to the memory array and continued during the retention interval of a change 
detection task.  
For example, Ruchkin et al. (1997) found a negative slow wave (NSW) over the 
temporal-occipital electrode sites that sustained over the retention period. The amplitude 
of the NSW increased with visual WM load (e.g. Mecklinger & Pfeifer, 1996; Ruchkin et 
al., 1997) highlighting the functional significance of the NSW as a neural reflection of 
WM storage. 
However, numerous non-mnemonic processes that occur during the performance of a 
change detection task might limit the functional interpretation of the NSW as a simple 
measure of WM. These, task-general processes (effort, arousal, sustained attention, 
anticipation for an event requiring a response etc.) may partly be responsible for the 
increase in amplitude with increasing set size and add up to the NSW. For instance, after 
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the offset of the memory array participants already anticipate the upcoming onset of the 
test array and prepare for a response. Indeed, a well-studied ERP component called the 
contingent negative variation (CNV), which is supposed to reflect such anticipation 
processes, shows similar characteristics in polarity and timing like the NSW (cf. 
McCollough, Machizawa, & Vogel, 2007), and thus, might overshadow mnemonic 
activity (Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). Although some alternative explanations like 
anticipation have been excluded (Ruchkin, Canoune, Johnson, & Ritter, 1995), 
disentangling the influence of generalized effort as task difficulty increases and WM load 
is more critical to control for. 
One useful approach to separate out specific cognitive activity from more general 
processes is the contralateral control method (Gratton, 1998). This approach is based on 
the contralateral hemispheric organization of the visual system and the logic is that 
general processes should be recordable bilaterally while WM specific processes should be 
prominent only in the contralateral hemisphere. The method thus isolates non-specific 
processes by comparing the neural activity recorded from the left and right hemisphere 
under certain experimental conditions. In order to do so, bilateral displays of stimuli are 
used and only one side of the array is relevant in any given trial. This approach allows 
specifying the process of interest by subtracting the electrophysiological activity 
measured over the contralateral from the ipsilateral hemisphere. By computing the 
differences between ipsilateral and contralateral slow wave such non-specific processes 
should be subtracted out. 
Recently, this approach has been used by Klaver, Talsma, Wijers, Heinze and Mulder 
(1999) to examine visual WM storage functioning. In their study, participants performed 
a bilateral change detection task. The memory array consisted of two abstract shapes, 
with one shape in each hemifield. A cue at the beginning of each trial indicated which 
abstract shape should be remembered (either left or right side). Participants were required 
to maintain the relevant shape for 1500 ms until a test object appeared. During the 
retention interval the authors observed a posterior NSW that was more pronounced in the 
hemisphere contralateral than ipsilateral of the to-be-to remembered shape, which was 
demonstrated by calculating the difference wave between activity at hemispheres 
ipsilateral (task general processes) and contralateral to the target (task general and 
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memory-specific processes). Thus, this sustained component appears to be a good 
reflection of WM storage functioning. 
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3 Contralateral Delay Activity – A Pure Neural 
Correlate of Working Memory Storage 
As reviewed in the preceding paragraph, Klaver et al. (1999) isolated a sustained 
component that appears to be a useful tool to examine WM maintenance. However, 
because they did not manipulate the number of presented stimuli, additional studies still 
had to demonstrate that this ERP is really a clean measure of WM. 
More recently, Vogel and Machizawa (2004) have used a similar contralateral approach 
like Klaver et al. (1999). Specifically, they also used a bilateral memory array to exclude 
task-general processes which are not related to WM maintenance, but manipulated 
different set sizes. They presented participants briefly (e.g., 100 ms) with different 
colored squares within a bilateral visual array while they retained fixation centrally. Their 
task was to maintain only the objects in a certain hemifield, as indicated by a cue. After a 
short (e.g., 1000 ms) retention interval, memory was tested with the presentation of a test 
array that was either identical or exhibited a change in the color of one item. Similar to 
Klaver et al. (1999), they observed a large negative-going sustained slow wave over the 
posterior parietal and lateral occipital electrode sites across the retention interval. This 
slow wave was more pronounced in contralateral electrodes to the memorized hemifield, 
which was demonstrated by calculating the difference wave between the activity 
measured at the ipsilateral and contralateral hemisphere. According to the contralateral 
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control approach this contralateral-specific activity should reflect the memorized 
information. They referred to this component as contralateral delay activity (CDA) which 
is also known as the sustained posterior contralateral negativity (Robitaille & Jolicoeur, 
2006). In the present work, we will use the nomenclature CDA. 
The CDA is a component with negative voltage that has been shown for stimuli that vary 
in different dimensions, such as color (Vogel & Machizawa, 2004), orientation 
(McCollough et al., 2007; Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005) and shape (Luria & Vogel, 
2011). It starts approximately 200 ms after the onset of the memory array and continues 
throughout the duration of the retention interval (e.g. 900 ms) (McCollough et al., 2007; 
Vogel & Machizawa, 2004), and therefore exceeding the time duration of iconic memory 
(Vogel et al., 2001). 
 
3.1 What Does CDA Amplitude Reflect: WM Load or Other 
Task General Factors? 
The strongest evidence that the CDA is a process-pure neural correlate of WM 
maintenance was the finding that CDA amplitude is sensitive to the number of 
memorized items. CDA activity increased for array sizes of one to three items until it 
reached a limit with arrays of approximately four items per side (Vogel & Machizawa, 
2004). Consequently, the amplitude of the CDA seems to be exhausted at the same point 
as behavioral estimates of WM capacity would predict (see Chapter 2.3). Additionally, 
CDA activity seems to be larger for correct than for incorrect responses (McCollough et 
al., 2007; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004), suggesting that this neural activity is important for 
correct task performance. More precisely, it seems to reflect maintenance of successful 
representations. As mentioned before, however, several other cognitive processes are also 
likely to affect CDA amplitude. Thus, the increase in CDA amplitude with larger set sizes 
may partially be a result of other processes. We see at least three alternative explanations 
which have to be ruled out before the CDA can be accepted as a measure of WM load (cf. 
Perez & Vogel, 2011). 
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The Influence of Task-General Processes such as Effort or Arousal 
The sustained slow potential might also reflect non-specific processes such as effort or 
arousal which are related generally to the task. As explained above, this is an important 
challenge for the validation of any neural correlate of a cognitive process and the 
specificity of it as reflection of truly mnemonic activity is still necessary (McCollough et 
al., 2007). With increasing WM load, task general processes such as effort, arousal and 
task difficulty do also increase. To rule out this possibility, Vogel and Machizawa (2004) 
also assessed memory arrays that were above the known limits of WM capacity (arrays of 
six, eight or ten items). Their logic was as follows: If the CDA reflects task-general 
processes such as task difficulty, then its amplitude should continuously become larger 
with larger set sizes. Alternatively, if the activity reflects WM storage, then one would 
expect the amplitude to reach an asymptote when a person’s WM capacity limit is 
reached. The results revealed that CDA activity increased until it reached an asymptote at 
array sizes around four items. No further increases for larger set sizes have been found. 
Though general processes such as task difficulty steadily increased for arrays above a 
person’s WM capacity limit, CDA amplitude did not. This has been taken as evidence 
that the task general processes cannot explain larger CDA amplitudes from set size one to 
four (see also McCollough et al., 2007). 
 
Controlling for Perceptual Influences 
Another alternative explanation concerns the perceptual requirements of a memory array. 
With increasing number of to-be-memorized items, the amount of perceptual effort also 
increases. In order to test for this, Ikkai, McCollough and Vogel (2010) compared CDA 
activity for arrays containing stimuli with high and low contrast and different set sizes. 
Items displayed in low contrast should require much more perceptual effort. Thus, if 
CDA amplitude is sensitive to perceptual requirements, the activity should be larger for 
arrays containing items with low relative to high contrast. Behaviorally, they found 
performance to be decreased in the low contrast condition. However, CDA amplitude did 
not reflect this. Its activity was only sensitive to the number of presented stimuli 
irrespective of whether the perceptual processing was effortful (low contrast) or not (high 
contrast), supporting the interpretation that CDA activity reflects the number of 
memorized representations. 
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The Influence of Item Location and Spatial Context 
It seems plausible that CDA amplitude is sensitive to the spatial information of the 
objects since the number of objects is typically confounded with the number of positions 
to be retained. To rule out this possibility, a control experiment has been conducted were 
the memory array was split up into two successive memory arrays, where items from both 
had to be retained. Critically, in some of the trials, the item of the second memory array 
appeared exactly at the same position as the item displayed in the first memory array. 
This design allowed to directly test whether the CDA reflects the number of presented 
items or attended locations. In line with the first explanation, the results of the control 
experiment only varied with the number of items irrespective of whether the items were 
presented at different locations or at the same location (Ikkai et al., 2010).  
Another potential confound influencing CDA amplitude is the spatial context or spatial 
relation between the items. In previous experiments, arrays with larger set sizes covered a 
larger spatial area within the hemifield compared to smaller set sizes. Consequently, with 
smaller, but not with larger set sizes, it is not necessary to dilate the focus of attention 
over a larger space. From this perspective, it may not be the increase in set size that 
accounts for the observed raise in CDA amplitude but the size of the required attentional 
spotlight. However, a study conducted by Mccollough et al. (2007) suggests that this 
interpretation is unlikely. Specifically, they manipulated the spatial distance between the-
to-be remembered items, one spaced and one compact condition respectively, while 
keeping the number of items constant. No effects of spatial distance on CDA activity 
were found. Its amplitude was solely modulated by the number of items. 
Together, the reviewed studies demonstrate that the CDA is a good indicator for the 
neural reflection of WM maintenance. Next, we will discuss whether differences in CDA 
amplitude are reflective of variations in WM capacity. 
 
3.2 The Sensitivity of CDA Amplitude to Individual 
Differences in WM capacity 
To further test the sensitivity of CDA amplitude to the number of items stored in WM, 
Vogel and Machizawa (2004) examined whether a person’s WM capacity specifically 
determines when his or her delay activity reaches a limit. If so, CDA amplitude for 
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participants with low WM capacity should reach this limit faster than persons with high 
WM capacities, who are able to retain more items in WM. However, it is not easy to 
quantify the precise CDA amplitude predicted for each individual based on a categorical 
data set such as set size. For instance, there is no array size of 3.6. Instead, Vogel and 
Machizawa (2004) calculated the amplitude increase between two and four items. The 
logic behind this was that the increase in CDA amplitude should be dictated by a person’s 
capacity. For instance, if a person has a low WM capacity of less than two items, its 
capacity resources should be completely consumed at two item as well as four item 
arrays, resulting in identical CDA amplitudes for two and four items. By contrast, for a 
person with a high WM capacity of nearly five items, his or her WM limit would not be 
reached at set size two. Consequently, the amplitude for set size four should show a large 
increase to set size two. Indeed, there was a strong positive correlation between a person’s 
memory capacity, as estimated with the K-Index and the point at which the CDA reached 
a limit.  
Taken together, CDA amplitude is apparently a pure reflection of item storage. Aside 
from being finely sensitive to the amount of information currently stored in WM, CDA 
amplitude is also sensitive to individual differences in WM capacity. Since the main focus 
of this dissertation project is disentangling causes underlying individual differences in 
WM capacity, we will employ CDA amplitude as electrophysiological reflection of item 
storage in Experiments 3 and 4 (Chapters 8 and 9). In the following we will provide a 
deeper insight in possible causes related to individual differences in WM storage. 
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Part 2 
The Nature of Individual Differences in 
Working Memory Capacity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Variability in Storage Space or Efficiency of 
Attentional Control? 
Aside from the robust average WM capacity of three to four items, several studies 
observed substantial individual differences in storage space. Across a healthy population, 
estimates of WM capacity ranged from 1.5 to 5 items (Awh et al., 2007; Fukuda, Awh, et 
al., 2010). Several potential causes for this are discussed.  
In the preceding chapters, we defined WM as a system responsible for the temporary 
maintenance of information (see Chapter 1). This view implies that the primary factor 
limiting WM capacity is the amount of storage space or more precisely the number of 
discrete representations or “slots” a person is able to retain (Awh et al., 2007; Luck & 
Vogel, 1997; Zhang & Luck, 2008). At each slot a single individuated item or chunk of 
information can be stored. Thus, the more slots a person has, the more information he or 
she is able to retain (see also Chapter 2.3). However, an alternative viewpoint argues that 
individual differences in WM capacity are due to variations in the ability to control the 
gating of relevant information into WM including the ability to resist distraction. The 
actual amount of information people are able to store might be relatively fixed across 
individuals at approximately four slots. What individuals differ in is how well each 
person can control what is stored in these slots. According to this idea, variance in WM 
capacity is partially caused by individual differences in cognitive control process or 
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attention control (Engle, 2002; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001). The account 
makes the simple prediction that tight associations between attention control and WM 
will lead to a significant relation between the ability to select relevant items for encoding 
and WM capacity (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006). This viewpoint is supported by multiple 
studies suggesting a tight link between memory capacity and control of attention. 
Importantly, many of these studies utilized attentional tasks with minimal memory 
requirements but high needs of attention control capabilities, specifically in the face of 
competition between habitual response schemas and the actual required task demands 
(Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001; Heitz & Engle, 2007; Hutchison, 2011; Kane et al., 
2001; Kane & Engle, 2003; Machizawa & Driver, 2011; Redick & Engle, 2006). Across 
all these tasks used in the different studies, WM capacity correlated with performance on 
the attentional task. For instance, high WM capacity individuals perform better on Stroop 
tasks (in which one must report the ink a color word is written in while ignoring the 
meaning of the word, e.g. Hutchison, 2011; Kane & Engle, 2003) and the antisaccade 
tasks (wherein people are required to look away from a target, e.g. Unsworth, Schrock, & 
Engle, 2004). These findings strongly suggest that the ability to control attention is 
associated with WM capacity. 
 
4.1 Attentional Selection and Working Memory Storage 
From the beginning of present WM research, most theories agreed on the need for 
regulation and control of information (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). However, the 
issue of control processes was only limited to those processes involved in pure 
memorization such as rehearsal (cf. Shah & Miyake, 1999). Given that WM has a very 
limited online capacity, it is of considerable importance not to let irrelevant information 
consume space in first place. Thus, the ability to process or select relevant information at 
the expense of irrelevant information before it enters WM is crucial for optimal use of 
WM storage space.  
Many researchers have already proposed a common link between selective attention – the 
ability to center our attention on relevant elements while other things are completely 
blended out – and WM (for reviews see Awh et al., 2006; Fougnie, 2008). They make the 
simple claim that the better people are at controlling the access of information into WM, 
the more efficiently the storage space is used. If individuals are perfectly efficient in 
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focusing on items that are currently necessary to complete a certain task, WM capacity is 
only filled with relevant information. By contrast, irrelevant information might also be 
represented if persons have poor selection mechanisms. “In this sense, attention can serve 
as a kind of “gatekeeper” for WM, by biasing the encoding of information toward the 
items that are most relevant to the current processing goals” (Awh et al., 2006, p. 202). 
Next, we review how attentional selection mechanisms contribute to individual 
differences in WM capacity.  
 
4.2 Investigating Individual Differences in Selection 
Mechanisms and Working Memory Capacity 
A sequence of studies has revealed that individuals with high and low WM capacity differ 
in their ability to control what information will be maintained in WM (Fukuda & Vogel, 
2009; Jost, Bryck, Vogel, & Mayr, 2011; Liesefeld, Liesefeld, & Zimmer, 2014; McNab 
& Klingberg, 2008; Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005). In such studies, participants take 
part in a change detection task as described in Chapter 2.1. Critically, on some of the 
trials both relevant and irrelevant stimuli are presented simultaneously engaging attention 
control processes and participants are instructed to remember only the relevant ones. For 
example, participants may perform feature-based selection such that they have to select 
items based on a certain color (Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005). For the upcoming 
memory comparison, only relevant information is tested. One can directly estimate the 
effect of selection processes on WM storage by comparing trials with and without 
distractors in accuracy and/or CDA amplitude as electrophysiological reflection of WM 
maintenance. For example, if participants are perfectly efficient in controlling the storage 
of information into WM, CDA amplitude in distractor-present trials (e.g., two targets and 
two distractors) should be identical to pure-target trials with the corresponding number of 
targets (two). By contrast, if the selection mechanism of an individual is poor and all 
items are unnecessarily stored in WM, CDA amplitude in the distractor-present trials 
should be identical to the condition when the same number of stimuli is presented, but all 
are targets (set size four). 
In one particular study conducted by Vogel and colleagues (2005) participants were 
required to remember the orientation of colored rectangles (e.g. red) while they recorded 
Electroencephalography (EEG). Crucially, they added distractor-present trials wherein 
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participants were required to select only a subset of items for WM storage. In these trials, 
participants should remember two red items out of an array consisting of two red and two 
blue items. On the remaining trials, arrays consisted of either two or four items per side 
(pure target trials). As an electrophysiological index for WM maintenance, CDA 
amplitude was used. They divided all subjects into two groups, high and low WM 
capacity individuals respectively, based on their behavioral estimated WM capacity (K-
Score). In individuals with high WM capacity CDA amplitude of remembering two items 
was the same as in the condition where two targets were presented among two distractors, 
suggesting that these individuals were efficient in selecting only relevant items for WM 
storage and excluding irrelevant ones. By contrast, for participants with low WM CDA 
amplitude for distractor-present trials was identical to those trials of memorizing four 
relevant stimuli, indicating that low WM capacity individuals were inefficient at 
controlling the access of items into WM storage. Each subject’s filtering efficiency 
extracted from CDA amplitude strongly correlated with the estimated behavioral WM 
score (see Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005 for details quantifying the efficiency index). 
However, previous research showed that color-based selection is very difficult and tends 
to be inefficient relative to selection of other attributes (Shih & Sperling, 1996). 
Consequently, it is likely that the relationship between WM capacity and selection 
mechanisms is only present under demanding conditions. To rule out this possibility, 
Vogel and colleagues (Fukuda & Vogel, 2009; Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005) 
conducted a series of control experiments. Instead of color-based selection they 
modulated selection based on location (Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005) or shape 
(Fukuda & Vogel, 2009). For location-based selection, items were presented in the upper 
or lower quadrant and subjects were cued to remember the stimuli of only one of the 
quadrants (targets). In another version of a bilateral change detection task, colored 
squares were used as targets and rectangles as distractors. In both studies, CDA amplitude 
was a valid measure for the number of items being maintained in WM. It varied as a 
function of WM capacity and efficiency of target selection. More precisely, CDA activity 
in the distractor-present condition for high WM capacity individuals was the same as in 
the pure-target condition with the corresponding number of targets. By contrast, for low 
WM capacity individuals the CDA in the distractor-present condition and pure-target 
trials with the same number of stimuli but all being targets was identical. This has been 
taken as evidence that CDA amplitude patterns observed in Vogel’s et al. (2005) 
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experiment are not restricted to challenging selection conditions. The ability to regulate 
which items enter to working memory seems to be crucial. 
 
4.3 Selective Attention Modulates Efficient Selection in 
Working Memory 
In the preceding section, we reviewed evidence that participants who are able to 
remember more items over short periods of time are also more efficient in controlling 
what information is maintained. Thus, one main component in understanding individual 
differences in WM capacity is to better understand how selection mechanisms contribute 
to individual differences in WM capacity. In line with theories of visual attention we 
propose a gating system or attentional filter that seems to enhance relevant and suppress 
irrelevant information. Thus, relevant and irrelevant information compete for limited 
processing resources. The competition is biased, however, towards information that is 
currently attended. Unattended information does not make demands on processing 
capacity (Bundesen, Habekost, & Kyllingsbaek, 2005; Bundesen, 1990; Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 1981; Olivers & Meeter, 2008). Thus, one cause of individual 
differences in selective attention might be the ability to focus attention on relevant items 
and to inhibit irrelevant items  
In a series of studies, Fukuda and Vogel (2009) investigated whether WM capacity is 
associated with an individual’s susceptibility to attentional capture by distractors. In one 
particular experiment, subjects completed a bilateral change detection task with 
distractor-present trials. Shortly after the offset of the memory array, task-irrelevant dots 
were flashed either at the target or the distractor locations. The logic behind this 
procedure was that electrophysiological markers should show enhanced evoked responses 
at locations to which attention was allocated. If people primarily focus their attention on 
targets, then the electrophysiological response evoked from dots at target locations should 
be increased relative to the response from dots at distractor locations. As 
electrophysiological index for attentional selection the P1/N1 complex was used, 
components which are assumed to be sensitive to spatial attention (Luck & Hillyard, 
1994). The higher the amplitudes of the P1/N1 complex, the more attention is assumed to 
be allocated to a certain position. Attentional capture was defined as the amplitude 
difference between the P1/N1 responses to dots flashed at locations of targets and 
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distractors. WM maintenance and attentional filtering, by contrast, was assumed to be 
reflected by CDA activity. First, they replicated the relationship between unnecessary 
storage of irrelevant information and CDA amplitude. Furthermore, and more 
importantly, the results revealed strong positive correlations between attentional capture 
and WM capacity. That is, individuals with high WM capacity showed larger P1/N1 
responses to dots at target locations than individuals with low WM capacity, indicating 
that high WM capacity individuals were less prone to allocate attention on distractors. 
Importantly, the attentional capture effect was also related to the CDA unnecessary 
storage effect as described before. Individuals who were less able to control the focus of 
attention on targets also maintained more irrelevant items in the later retention period. 
Thus, selective attention mechanisms are tightly associated with individual differences in 
WM capacity as well as the efficiency of using WM resources. The aim of our first 
experiment was to further characterize the relationship between the engagement of 
selective attention on targets and WM capacity and is described in the following. 
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5 Experiment 1: Working Memory Capacity and 
Voluntary Selection Mechanisms 
5.1 Introduction 
Much research suggests that attentional mechanisms play a critical role in efficient WM 
functioning. Their primary purpose seems to be the selection of relevant and the 
inhibition of irrelevant information (Bleckley, Durso, Crutchfield, Engle, & Khanna, 
2003; Fukuda & Vogel, 2009; Kane et al., 2001; McNab & Klingberg, 2008; Vogel, 
McCollough, et al., 2005). Thus, knowing more about attentional control and its 
contributing selection mechanisms is crucial for understanding differences in WM 
capacity. 
In the preceding chapters, we have reviewed evidence that the focus of attention 
influences the probability of storing information in WM, such as that information which 
is currently attended is biased for encoding relative to unattended information (Desimone 
& Duncan, 1995). We further argued that individuals which are less efficient to control 
the engagement of attention on task-relevant information, probably are also less efficient 
28 | Individual Differences in Working Memory 
 
 
 
at excluding irrelevant information from being stored in WM (for a review see Awh & 
Vogel, 2008). Thus, the ability to orient attention on relevant information seems to be 
crucial for optimal WM functioning and individuals with high and low WM capacity 
differ in their efficiency of doing so (Fukuda & Vogel, 2009; Heitz & Engle, 2007). 
However, memory processing is not only influenced by the allocation of attention to a 
particular item but also the time attention dwells on the to-be-stored information 
(Hollingworth, Williams, & Henderson, 2001; Williams, Henderson, & Zacks, 2005). 
Once objects are within the focus of attention, they gain advantages in information 
processing (Eriksen & James, 1986) while fewer processing resources are allocated 
outside the focus of attention (Handy, Soltani, & Mangun, 2001; Lavie, 1995). Thus, the 
less time attention dwells on a presented item, the lower is the probability that this item 
will be encoded into WM. In a study that tested this idea, Fukuda and Vogel (2011; see 
also Cashdollar et al., 2013) evaluated whether WM capacity is associated with the speed 
of disengaging attention from the information that captured the attention in the first place. 
In their study, participants completed a visual search task. In some of the trials an 
irrelevant peripheral flanker appeared prior to the search display. The flanker was either 
presented in the target color or not and its onset was assumed to capture attention. 
Critically, they varied the stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) between the flanker 
display and the presentation of the search array. Interestingly, at the shortest SOA (50 ms) 
flanker impacted search performance for high and low WM capacity individuals. 
However, performance costs at the 150 ms SOA varied substantially across both WM 
groups, with no decrease in costs for low WM capacity individuals, indicating that they 
needed more time to disengage their focus of attention once it has been captured. 
Therefore, the individual’s speed of disengagement may be a critical trait which 
determines WM capacity. If low WM capacity individuals need more time to do so, 
distractors might be processed and unnecessarily represented in WM competing with 
relevant items for storage space. 
However, the slower disengagement was specific to flankers that shared the target 
defining selection feature, namely the same color. Those flankers that were presented in 
different colors did not slow down attentional disengagement. Thus, individual 
differences in WM capacity were only associated with delayed disengagement upon 
target feature contingent capture. According to the contingent capture account (e.g. Folk, 
Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Folk & Remington, 2006), allocation of attention depends 
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critically on selection features, that is, the attributes for which attention is set. If a 
stimulus contains the relevant attribute, it will be selected for processing. The initiation of 
a target response will be triggered. Only if the processed stimulus has been identified as 
distractor, its further processing will be stopped. According to this view, disengagement 
operates at a late stage of processing after the object has been selected for encoding and 
after it has been classified as distractor. Yet, attention can influence encoding in multiple 
stages of processing. This includes both post perceptual processes (Deutsch & Deutsch, 
1963) and early sensory processes (Broadbent, 1958). In fact, there is also support for an 
association between early visual processing prior to (Murray, Nobre, & Stokes, 2011) or 
at the moment of selection (Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998; Zanto & Gazzaley, 2009) and 
we ourselves believe that such early selection processes play an important role in 
explaining why individuals with low WM capacity are less efficient in controlling which 
information enters WM. 
In studies showing unnecessary storage costs in CDA pattern (Jost et al., 2011; Liesefeld 
et al., 2014; McNab & Klingberg, 2008; Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005), distractors 
never contained the target defining feature. Thus, according to the contingent capture 
account they could in principle be excluded from further processing via selection 
mechanisms. For example, participants being prepared that distractors may appear could 
perhaps boost processing of task relevant items so that distractors never win the race for 
representation. By doing so, they shield WM against distraction. Slow disengagement 
would be unimportant in this case because distractors would never be erroneously 
selected as targets. Recently, Rutman, Clapp, Chadick and Gazzaley (2010) explored the 
temporal dynamics of electrophysiological activity associated with selective encoding and 
its influences on subsequent WM performance. In their study participants took part in a 
selective-delayed recognition paradigm. More precisely, participants saw overlapped 
images of natural scenes and faces and were instructed to remember only scenes or faces 
and to ignore the irrelevant image. Their results revealed that goal-orientated processing 
(the selection of relevant and suppression of irrelevant information) begins as early as 97 
ms after stimulus presentation (P100 component). Furthermore, and more importantly, the 
extent to which participants were able to selectively focus on task-relevant information 
was correlated with each participant’s WM performance. This finding highlights the 
influence of early sensory modulation on subsequent memory performance.  
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We reason that individual variations in WM capacity might be reflective of variations at 
early sensory processing steps. The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate the possibility 
that individual differences in WM capacity are reflective of variations in the engagement 
of attention. We estimated individual differences in WM capacity based on WM 
performance in a classical color change detection task as described in Chapter 2. 
Furthermore, we implemented two attention tasks to evaluate the relationship between 
attention control and WM capacity. 
To measure individual differences in the ability to voluntarily control the focus of 
attention on targets we used a modified variant of the antisaccade task. The antisaccade 
task is an attentional task with minimal memory requirements, nevertheless performance 
correlates with WM capacity (Kane et al., 2001; Unsworth et al., 2004). Moreover, the 
role of saccade execution has recently been linked to attention control (Edlin & Lyle, 
2013). In our variant of the task – called cued categorization task – the task demands 
should be comparable to those in an antisaccade task but do not require the measurement 
of eye movements. Participants had to identify the color of a target item, which was 
defined by its location. We realized three different versions of the task. In two of them 
cue-dependent allocation of attention was necessary with different amounts of executive 
attention control. In these trials, a cue indicated 100 % validly the target’s location and 
participants were instructed to use the information of the cue to voluntarily allocate 
attention towards the target location. In order to make cue processing and use of its 
information necessary, the probe displayed a competitor at another location than the 
target location. Thus, the presence of the competitor was a crucial manipulation to test 
WM capacity related effects in the control of attentional allocation. However, in contrast 
to studies testing the effects of attentional disengagement, the competitor never shared the 
selection feature of the target since the target was in advance defined by its position.  
The cue either informed participants that the target would appear at the cued (same) 
location (stay trials) or at the opposite side of the cued location (shift trials). When the 
target appeared at the same location as the cue, attention allocation is thought to be 
automatically triggered and no higher attention control mechanism should be involved 
(like on prosaccade trials). Conversely, when the target will appear at the opposite side, a 
voluntary initiation of an attention shift must be programmed to the new target location. 
Like on antisaccade trials, attention control processes should operate. In sum, our task 
realized two different conditions of directing attention to targets. In stay trials, nothing 
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had to be done additionally and the incoming target at the actual attended location had to 
be processed. In shift trials, an additional voluntary attention shift was necessary which 
made attention control necessary. If the implementation of this shift is too slow or too 
error prone the competitor will be selected as the target and its color will be classified. 
Because we assumed that low WM participants are less efficient in the voluntary 
engagement of attention we expected better performance for high WM than low WM 
participants in shift trials. In stay trials, we expected no or only small differences because 
it was not necessary to change attentional focus. For the purpose of comparison we 
realized a third condition in which only one target item was presented. Because in the 
baseline condition the target is a single stimulus that is displayed it should be 
automatically selected and we therefore expected similar performance between the two 
groups. 
Additionally, we hypothesized that participants with high or low WM capacity differ in 
the speed of their control processes. In order to test this, we realized two different cue to 
target SOAs. The time courses of the SOAs were chosen to guarantee optimal utility of 
the cue. Wright and Ward (1994) reported that the effectiveness of information cues 
reaches a maximum level at SOA of 300 ms and remains stable across further increases in 
SOA. Hence, the shortest SOA we realized in our study was set to 300 ms and we 
contrasted this with a longer SOA of 450 ms. Thus, the realized SOAs between cue and 
target presentation were long enough to evaluate the symbolic content of the cue, and any 
time dependent costs should therefore reflect individual differences in the ability to orient 
attention. Specifically, we expected high WM but not low WM participants to be able to 
shift attention even within the short SOA, so that SOA should influence performance only 
for low WM participants. 
To specify the exact relationship between WM capacity and attention control, participants 
further completed the attentional network test (ANT) – a low-level attention task 
assessing different functions of attention (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 
2002). One view of attention is that it consists of different, interrelated functions. Besides 
the already introduced ability to orient attention on relevant information in face of 
competing sensory information for privileged processing, two further functions are 
distinguished, alerting and executive control respectively. Alerting is proposed to reflect 
the general ability to prepare and sustain responsiveness to sensory signals and executive 
control is assumed to resolve conflicts in information processing among competing 
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mental processes (Fan et al., 2002; Petersen & Posner, 2012; Posner & Petersen, 1989). 
The main function of implementing the ANT was to explore whether differences in WM 
capacity corresponds to differences in varies functions of attention or if they are specific 
to orienting. 
5.2 Methods 
Participants completed a battery of cognitive tasks including different attention and 
memory tasks. The task order was differently across participants. For the purpose of this 
dissertation project performance in the color change detection task, the cued 
categorization task and the ANT are of central importance and will be described in the 
following. 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
Sixty-seven volunteers were recruited for participation in exchange for 8€ per hour or 
course credit. Three participants were excluded because their performance on the cued 
categorization task was below chance level, three participants due to experimental errors 
and one participant showed a PR-score below chance level for array size four in the 
change detection task. All analyses were based on the remaining sixty participants (age 
range = 15-35 years, M = 23.73, 41 female). This and all subsequent experiments have 
been conducted in accordance with ethical guidelines and received ethical clearance. 
Participants gave informed written consent after the nature of the study has been 
explained to them. 
 
5.2.2 Stimuli  
Change Detection Task 
Memory arrays were presented within a 9.8° × 7.3° region on the monitor against a grey 
background. Stimulus positions were randomized with the restriction that all stimuli were 
separated by at least 2° center to center. Stimuli were randomly chosen from a set of 
seven colored squares (blue, green, red, yellow, white, black and purple) with a size of 
0.65° × 0.65°. 
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Cued Categorization Task 
All stimuli were presented against a grey background. Cue items subtended a visual angle 
of 0.3° and provided valid information of the target’s location. This was achieved via the 
position of the cue. In stay trials, the stimulus appearing at the same position was target 
and in shift trials the stimulus at the horizontal side of the display. Circles indicated stay 
trials, whereas diamonds indicated shift trials. For baseline trials, a blank display was 
presented for the same duration as the cue. The mask array contained of two different 
squares filled with random lines. They subtended a visual angle of 1.16° × 1.16°. The 
masks were replaced by two colored squares (0.7° × 0.7°) as probe items. Square colors 
were randomly chosen from a set of four highly discriminable colors (red, blue, green or 
yellow) with the restriction that no color could appear twice within the same array. For 
baseline trials, only one target appeared. Target, cue and competitor were shown at 
locations 11.5° of visual angle to the left and right of the center. 
  
Attentional Network Task 
Stimuli consisted of a row of five horizontal lines, with arrowheads pointing either left or 
right. The arrowhead in the center was the target. It was either flanked by arrowheads 
pointing into the same direction (congruent condition) or different direction (incongruent 
condition), or by horizontal lines (neutral condition). Stimuli consisted of 0.55° of visual 
angle and each stimulus was separated by 0.06° of visual angle. In total the stimuli 
obtained a visual angle of 3.08°. To implement an attentional orienting component target 
and flanker stimuli were presented either 1.06° above or below fixation cross in the center 
of the screen. 
Cue stimuli were asterisks. In total four different types of cues were used: no cue, center 
cue, double cue or spatial cue. For the no cue condition, participants just saw a fixation 
cross. For the center cue condition, the cue was presented at the center of the screen at the 
location of the fixation cross. For the double cue trials, two cues appeared at the possible 
target positions – one below and one above the fixation cross. Spatial cues appeared 
either above or below the fixation cross and indicated 100% validly the target position.  
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5.2.3 Procedure 
Change Detection Task 
To measure an individual’s working memory capacity, we used a centralized color 
change detection task as described in Chapter 2. Subjects viewed (for 100 ms) four or six 
colored squares on a gray background. After a brief blank delay period of 900 ms, 
memory was tested with the presentation of a test array. The test display remained on the 
screen for maximally 2000 ms or until the participant made a response, whichever came 
first. Participants had to detect a color change that occurred in 50% of the trials. In change 
trials, only one square changed to a different color in the color set with the restriction that 
no color could appear twice at the present display. The location of the stimuli always 
remained the same (see Figure 5.1). Subjects pressed one button to indicate if the array 
was identical and another to state a difference. Forty trials were presented for each set 
size. Prior to this, participants completed ten practice trials with feedback indicating a 
correct or false response. 
We computed Kmax as described in chapter 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Design of the color change detection task of Experiment 1. Depicted is a change 
trial. 
 
Cued Categorization Task 
The procedure is illustrated in Figure 5.2. Participants were required to categorize the 
color of a target item. On two-thirds of the trials the target was accompanied by a color 
competitor: an identical square of a different color on the opposite side. At the beginning 
of each trial, the word “ready?” was presented for 1500 ms to warn participants that a trial 
was about to start. A black fixation cross (green in baseline trials) appeared for a time 
period which was randomly chosen from 500-1500 ms. In the cued condition, a peripheral 
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cue was flashing for 250 ms. The cue provided valid information of the target’s location. 
On stay trials, the item appearing at the same location as the cue was the target. By 
contrast, on shift trials the stimulus appearing at the opposite side was the target. On the 
remaining trials, a blank display was presented for the same duration as the cue and an 
isolated item was shown as the target either on the left or on the right. After the offset of 
the cue display, at both locations a square was presented as a mask for 50 or 200 ms. 
Masks were replaced by two colored squares as probe items. The response was delivered 
by pressing the button on the response pad that matched the color of the target. At the end 
of the 1700 ms interval or after the participant made a response, the display turned blank 
for 1700 ms. Participants completed 180 trials in total, sixty trials for every cue type. All 
trials were randomly mixed. Before the test procedure started, participants performed a 
practice block consisting of twelve trials with feedback about the correctness of the 
measured response.  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Schematics of the experimental procedure of the cued categorization task in Experiment 
1. The cue was presented at the peripheral display location and flashing for 250 ms. The target 
array contained one or two colored squares which remained for 1700ms on the screen or until 
response. On cued trials, the target location was defined by the cue. 
 
To check whether cues could be identified, all participants took part in a short block 
wherein they needed to classify the cue’s shape at the beginning of the experiment. In this 
block, participants completed a minimum of ten trials and continued until reaching a 
performance of at least 80% correct or a maximum of twenty trials. 
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Attentional Network Task 
The materials and procedure for the ANT followed from the information that has been 
previously published (Fan et al., 2002). The experimental procedure is depicted in Figure 
5.3. At the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross appeared for a variable time of 400 to 
600 ms. Then, one of the four cue types was presented for 100 ms. The implementation of 
multiple cues is crucial and allowed to specify the alerting and orienting component. 
Alertness in the ANT is involved in all trials containing a cue informing participants on 
the upcoming flanker display. Orienting is involved by reallocating attention from the 
fixation cross to the target stimulus in the center of the screen. After the offset of the 
warning cue, participants saw a fixation cross for a further 400 ms and then the target 
display appeared. Both target and flankers were displayed together. Participants were 
instructed to classify as quickly and accurately as possible the direction the target was 
pointing to. After 1700 ms or the participant’s response, whichever came first, there was a 
further fixation period. The duration of the inter-trial-interval was calculated as 3500 ms 
minus the duration of the first fixation cross minus reaction time. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Example of the procedure of the ANT assessed in Experiment 1. Depicted is a trial 
with incongruent flanker and spatial cue. 
 
The ANT consisted of 24 trials with feedback about correctness. Then the experimental 
procedure began. Participants underwent three experimental blocks with no feedback. 
Each block consisted of 96 trials (4 cue condition× 2 target location × 2 target direction × 
3 flanker condition × 2 repetition). All trials were randomly mixed. 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Working Memory Task 
The mean WM capacity estimate was 3.74 (SD = 1.00) ranging from 1.40 to 5.70. 
Participants were divided into two groups by a median split, high capacity (M = 4.56, 
SD = 0.54) and low capacity (M = 2.92, SD = 0.60) individuals respectively. 
 
5.3.2 Cued Categorization Task 
Figure 5.4 shows the mean accuracy achieved by high and low WM capacity individuals 
in all experimental conditions. On baseline trials, all participants performed equally 
irrespective of WM capacity or SOA. However, the cue conditions in which a competitor 
was presented together with the target seemed to make the task harder for low WM 
capacity individuals. This is most pronounced on shift trials and a short SOA. No such 
effects were found for high WM capacity individuals. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Accuracy data as a function of cue and SOA for both WM capacity 
groups in Experiment 1; error bars represent plus or minus one standard error 
of the mean. 
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A three way 3 (Cue: baseline, stay, shift) × 2 (SOA: 300 vs. 450) × 2 (WM Capacity: high 
vs. low) repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) with WM capacity as between 
subject factor was conducted to examine the effect of cue and SOA on accuracy for the 
two capacity groups. We do not report main effects because they are qualified by two 
significant two way interactions, Cue × WM capacity and SOA × WM capacity 
respectively. The two-way interaction of Cue and WM Capacity, F(2, 116) = 3.83, p < 
.05, ηp
2
 = .06, suggests a differential relationship of accuracy for cues between high and 
low WM participants. No differences in accuracy between cue conditions were found for 
high WM individuals (largest F(1, 58) = 1.44, p = .24). In contrast, for low WM 
participants, accuracy in shift trials were lower compared to baseline, F(1, 58) = 21.93, p 
< .01; even performance on stay trials was significantly reduced relative to baseline, F(1, 
58) = 13.88, p < .01. The difference between stay and shift trials was not significant, F(1, 
58) = 1.93, p > .05). Direct group comparisons between low and high WM capacity 
individuals revealed that accuracy in shift trials was significantly greater for high WM 
individuals, F(1, 58) = 8.78, p < .01. As expected, no differences in baseline were found 
(F < 1.00).  
 
Table 5.1. Mean accuracy and standard deviations of participants with high and low WMC in 
each condition of the ANT as assessed in Experiment 1. 
 Cue 
Flanker No Center Double Spatial 
High WMC     
Neutral .99 (.005) .98 (.006) .99 (.005) .99 (.005) 
Congruent .99 (.003) .97 (.006) .99 (.004) .99 (.004) 
Incongruent .96 (.010) .05 (.010) .93 (.013) .96 (.008) 
Low WMC     
Neutral .99 (.005) .99 (.006) .99 (.005) .99 (.005) 
Congruent .99 (.003) .99 (.006) .99 (.004) .99 (.004) 
Incongruent .97 (.010) .96 (.012) .96 (.013) .98 (.008) 
 
The two-way interaction of SOA and WM Capacity was marginally significant, F(1, 58) 
= 2.87, p < .10. Low WM individuals showed poorer performance on trials with short 
SOA than on trials with long SOA, F(1, 58) = 10.28, p < .01. High WM participants were 
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not influenced by variation in the length of the SOA (F < 1.00). For low WM participants, 
a short SOA reduced performance strongly in shift trials, F(1, 58) = 6.91, p = .01, the 
small difference in stay trials was not significant, F(1, 58) = 1.57, p > .10. 
 
5.3.3 Attentional Network Test 
We carried out a 4-level Cue condition (no, center, double, spatial cue) × 3-level Flanker 
type (neutral, congruent, incongruent) ANOVA with WM capacity as between subject 
factor. For the accuracy data, the main effect of WM capacity was significant, F(1, 58) = 
3.88, p = .05. High capacity individuals performed the task more accurately relative to 
low WM capacity individuals (see Table 5.1). No further effects involving WM capacity 
were significant. Since accuracy was ceiling for low and high WM capacity individuals, 
our focus will be on the RT data.  
 
Table 5.2. Means of the median RT (milliseconds) and standard deviations of participants with 
high and low WMC in each condition of the ANT as assessed in Experiment 1. 
 Cue 
Flanker No Center Double Spatial 
High WMC     
Neutral 553 (14) 510 (14) 507 (13) 463 (12) 
Congruent 550 (15) 506 (13) 512 (12) 467 (12) 
Incongruent 643 (21) 615 (22) 603 (20) 540 (21) 
Low WMC     
Neutral 574 (14) 532 (14) 532 (13) 471 (12) 
Congruent 567 (15) 525 (14) 522 (12) 473 (13) 
Incongruent 677 (21) 667 (22) 651 (20) 570 (21) 
 
ANOVA of the RT data were based on mean median RTs for correct trials only. Mean 
RT data are displayed in Table 5.2. The interaction between flanker and WM capacity 
approached significance, F(2, 116) = 3.26, p < .07, ε = .60. Individuals with low WM 
capacity showed a larger difference between compatible and incompatible trials, F(1, 58) 
= 4.04, p < .05, indicating that the WM groups differ in executive attention. No further 
comparison yielded significance (Fs<1.00). 
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We further calculated two separately one-way ANOVAs for the alerting and orienting 
function with WM capacity as independent factor. Alerting was calculated as difference 
between mean median RT of the double and no cue condition and orienting by subtracting 
the mean median RT of the spatial cue condition from mean median RT of the center cue. 
Individuals with high and low WM capacity did not differ in altering, F < 1.00, but in 
orienting F(1, 58) = 4.72, p <.05. As can be seen in Figure 5.5, we observed a larger 
difference for low than high WM capacity individuals between center and spatial cue 
conditions. Note that the executive control component defined as difference between 
congruent and incongruent trials was already quantified in our post-hoc analyses of the 
significant WM capacity and flanker interaction. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. The ANT difference scores for 
high and low WMC groups as obtained in 
Experiment 1; the error bars represent plus 
or minus one standard error of the mean. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
In Experiment 1 we set out to investigate attention control and its contribution to 
understanding individual differences in WM capacity. In order to do so, we assessed each 
participants WM capacity and divided participants into two WM capacity groups. 
Participants completed further a battery of attention task, the cued categorization task and 
the ANT respectively. We hypothesized that individuals with low WM capacity would be 
less efficient in orienting attention to target stimuli. For both attention tasks, we found 
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evidence for this hypothesis. For the ANT, differences between WM capacity groups 
were seen in the orienting network, which was interpreted to reflect individual variations 
in target selection. For the cued categorization task, we found low WM capacity 
individuals to perform less accurately on shift trials compared to baseline trials. By 
contrast, no such effects were found for those participants with high WM capacity. These 
were the predicted findings. Low WM participants seem to be less efficient in engaging 
attention on relevant information and they seem to need more time to set up this function 
than the high WM group. Unexpectedly, in stay trials low WM participants also showed 
poorer performance than at baseline and the effect was as large as in shift trials with long 
SOA.  
A possible reason for this reduction in accuracy in stay trials is that low WM participants 
are generally less efficient in situations requiring controlled attention. In fact, in stay as 
well as shift trials correct task performance depends on the cue, and thus, in both 
conditions cognitive control is necessary to specify the appropriate task requirements 
upon the cue. If this control process is impaired, performance is more error-prone. We 
reason that the requirement to specify the cue in our cued categorization task is similar to 
continuous performance tasks (Braver & Barch, 2002; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992) 
or context-updating tasks (Lenartowicz, 2010), a specific version of the continuous 
performance task in which the context specifies the next to-be-performed action. In the 
standard version of the continuous performance task, participants view a continuous 
stream of letters and respond to a specific target. For example, in the AX variant of the 
task, participants should detect the target letter “X” with a certain button press only when 
it follows the letter “A”. For all other letters, including an “X” that is not preceded by an 
“A” (BX trials), participants should react by pressing another button. The AX trial is 
usually the most frequent one. Thus, the correct reaction on the target letter X is 
contingent of the context provided by a cue (A letter or no A letter). Redick and 
colleagues (Redick & Engle, 2011; Redick, 2014) very recently used this task to explore 
the relationship between WM capacity and the ability to use task context information to 
specify the task set. They found individuals with low WM capacity to make more errors 
in AX and BX trials relative to high WM capacity individuals. In other words, only high 
WM participants behaved adaptively and they used the task context to specify the target 
response in advance. This is similar to our cued categorization task in which the location 
of the to-be-categorized target is contingent on the cue. A cue first has to be evaluated 
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specifying the actual task set, i.e. “do nothing and stay at the actual position” or “shift 
attention to the opposite side”. If this explanation is correct, low WM participants would 
not be especially slow in voluntarily initiating attention shifts, but more generally in 
specifying task sets for cognitive control.  
Additionally, stay and shift trials in the cued categorization task were presented in a 
mixed order, so that for each trial the appropriate task sets have to be coordinated and 
constantly adapted in correspondence to the current task demands. This requires to 
retrieve or reactivate the new task set and to inhibit the irrelevant one whenever the task 
requirements have changed. Thus, one aspect that influences the ease of task set 
specification is whether individuals are efficient in resolving the conflict between the 
current task set and the irrelevant one. According to the controlled-attention view (see 
Chapter 4.1) we would expect individuals with high WM capacity to be more effective in 
doing so. This is exactly what our results of the executive attention function assessed in 
the ANT promote – a function of attention which is assumed to reflect online response-
competition. Specifically, we found individuals with low WM capacity to be slower in 
resolving the response conflict than their high WM capacity counterparts. In our cued 
categorization task, we observe an analogous competition. The occurrence of the cue 
elicits task set competition and requires further attentional control in form of higher 
executive functions to resolve this conflict. In this view, the faster individuals are in 
resolving conflicts of competing responses, the better they should perform in our cued 
categorization task. Thus, individual variations in WM capacity seem to be most evident 
in situations where there are multiple distractors and/or a prepotent behavior that conflicts 
with the desired target behavior. This effect has also been demonstrated in Stroop tasks, 
wherein participants are instructed to name the ink of the color the word is written in. 
Here, WM capacity differences were found to be associated with Stroop interference 
(Hutchison, 2011; Kane & Engle, 2003; Morey et al., 2012). For instance, Kane and 
Engle (2003) varied the proportion of trials being congruent in ink and color in Stroop 
tasks. The largest differences in errors between high and low WM capacity groups on the 
incongruent trials were found when most of the trials were congruent in ink of color and 
word. More precisely, the proportion of congruent Stroop trials did not affect 
performance of high WM capacity individuals. In contrast, low WM capacity individuals 
made more errors on incongruent trials when the amount of congruent trials was high.  
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Given these differences between high and low WM participants with regard to the ability 
to specify and coordinate task sets, it is possible that the results of Experiment 1 go back 
to the necessity of reconfiguring the task set (stay or shift) upon task contexts (the cue) on 
a trial-by-trial basis. This hypothesis will be investigated in Experiment 2 of this 
dissertation project. 
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6 Experiment 2: The Influence of Task Set 
Reconfiguration Processes 
6.1 Introduction 
Experiment 1 delivered several indications that low WM capacity individuals might show 
deficits in reconfiguring appropriate task sets. In other words, the differences in WM 
capacity found in our cued categorization task might not per se reflect individual 
differences in voluntarily orienting attention towards relevant stimuli to bias them for 
privileged processing, but may reflect differences in the ability to specify and coordinate 
changing task demands. In Experiment 1, stay and shift trials were presented in a mixed 
order, so that for each trial the appropriate task set had to be monitored, and if needed, 
reconfigured for adequate task performance, so the deficit of low WM capacity 
individuals could indeed reflect deficits in task set reconfiguration. Such reconfiguration 
processes include the selection, implementation and coordination of a set of specific 
processes (Meiran, 1996). The main aim of Experiment 2 was to evaluate this hypothesis. 
In theory, each task requires the configuration of mental resources or task sets (Jersild, 
1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This concept refers to the ability to configure an 
appropriate set of processes in accordance to task requirements. Task sets include 
representations of relevant objects, reactions and corresponding S-R mappings. Thus, 
selective attention mechanisms are conceptually incorporated in task sets 
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(Vandierendonck, 2014). By definition no more than one task set can be active at the 
same time. If multiple tasks are to be completed, a reconfiguration or switch process of 
task set settings is required (Olivers & Meeter, 2008) including the adaptation of 
cognitive processes in face of environmental changes. This coordination process is often 
referred to as cognitive flexibility and is proposed to be function of cognitive control 
(Miyake et al., 2000).  
Imagine a person performing a discrete task. On some trials the task changes (switches) 
and on others the task remains the same. Each task requires an appropriate configuration 
of mental resources. The efficiency with which we perform the task depends on the 
flexibility that allows the rapid implementation of the appropriate task set when needed. If 
the task changes, the old task set must be suppressed and the new task set activated. As a 
result, reconfiguration costs arise. This effect has been extensively studied in task 
switching paradigms. Here, performance on single task blocks, were participants perform 
the same task, is better compared to mixed blocks, where task demands change on a trial-
by-trial basis. This has been taken as evidence for global task set reconfiguration costs 
(see Monsell, 2003 for a review). Recently, Liefooghe, Barrouillet, Vandierendonck and 
Camos (2008) revealed that a reduction of performance in a WM task can indeed be 
induced by the introduction of a task switching requirement. They completed a series of 
experiments where they implemented task switching in continuous complex span tasks 
(see Chapter 2.1 for task description). The results revealed that the number of recalled 
stimuli declines when the amount of task switches increases. “As WM capacity is 
assumed to be limited, either task may suffer from the overlapping task execution, at least 
to the extent that both call on the shared resource” (Vandierendonck, 2012, p. 230). Thus, 
it might be expected that performance in a dual-task design is reduced whenever there is a 
second task that taps into the same process. For example, in our cued categorization task 
performance might suffer because selecting the appropriate task set based upon the cue 
and selecting the target might both tax the same resources. 
In order to investigate whether our findings in Experiment 1 are due to global task set 
reconfiguration costs or deficits in voluntarily engaging attention to targets, we 
implemented single blocks consisting of either stay or shift trials in our procedure. If low 
WM capacity individuals are not generally less efficient in controlling the allocation of 
attention, but are limited in their ability or willingness to reconfigure task sets in any 
given trial, we should find no or smaller individual differences on single task blocks. That 
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is, low and high WM capacity individuals should perform equally well. However, if 
individuals differ in the ability to execute allocation of attention voluntarily, we would 
expect identical costs in single stay and shift blocks as in the mixed block. Additionally, 
in the mixed block we increased the proportion of stay trials compared to shift and 
baseline trials. As stated in Chapter 5.4 (Kane & Engle, 2003; Redick, 2014) low WM 
capacity individuals are less likely to respond according to task requirements when the 
habitual response is predominant in the task context. In the cued categorization task, stay 
trials, i.e. keeping the attention at the attended location, can be considered to be 
associated with the more habitual reaction. Hence, increasing the number of these trials 
should make the task more demanding and magnify differences in the abilities of 
attention control.  
Furthermore, in Experiment 2 we increased the motivation to make use of the cue before 
the target is presented. The presentation duration of the target array in Experiment 1 was 
very long which provided individuals with sufficient time to solve the task by a reactive 
strategy. From this account, individuals might not have exclusively used the cue 
information in advance to orient attention towards the target location prior to the onset of 
the target display but might have used memory of the cue at a late point in time when the 
target was already presented. If participants remember the cue and its location, they can 
reactively infer which of the two squares was indicated as target. That this possibility 
exists may reduce the motivation to proactively orient attention upon the presentation of 
the cue. We took a number of actions to increase this motivation: We decreased the 
presentation duration of the target array, we masked the target, and we made the 
perceptual task more demanding so that orienting attention prior to the onset of the target 
display is the most efficient strategy. 
 
6.2 Method 
Except as noted below, all details were identical to Experiment 1. Participants took part in 
a similar cued categorization task alongside different change detection tasks. Again we 
changed task order across participants. For the current purpose only the cued 
categorization task is of central relevance and will be described in the following. 
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6.2.1 Participants 
From those participants that completed all assigned tasks in Experiment 1, we recruited 
41 participants. Six participants were excluded owing to accuracies below chance in the 
cued categorization task of Experiment 2. All analyses were conducted on the remaining 
35 participants (age range = 18-35 years, M = 23.63, 23 female). All participants were 
compensated for their time with 8€ per hour for their participation. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Example of experimental procedure of Experiment 2. Depicted is a shift trial. 
 
6.2.2 Stimuli 
All stimuli were presented at the corners of an imaginary polygon within 2.8° × 2.4° 
region on the monitor and contained a visual angle of 0.8°. We changed the stimulus 
material into Landolt Cs. Unlike colors, Landolt Cs are more complex stimuli and require 
focal attention at the time of presentation to process them correctly. One target was 
accompanied by three competitors. Before and after the probe array, squares were 
displayed as masks. 
 
6.2.3 Procedure 
The basic procedure remained the same as in Experiment 1 but the targets were changed 
(see Figure 6.1). In this task version targets were Landolt Cs and each target was 
accompanied by three competitive items. Subjects were required to identify the 
orientation of the cued item at a single spatial location (at the same position as the cue or 
at the horizontal opposite side of it, depending on the identity of the cue). Shortly before 
the onset and after the offset of the target display, four placeholders (squares) were 
displayed. The presentation duration of all displays remained the same as in the cued 
categorization task of Experiment 1 except for the duration of the target array, which was 
reduced to 100 ms. On baseline trials a green fixation cross was flashed for the same 
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duration time as the cue in the center of the screen. The response was delivered by 
pressing the button on the response pad that matched the orientation of the Landolt C 
which was currently the target. Participants performed three blocks: One stay, one shift 
and one mixed block. At the beginning of each block, participants were given several 
practice trials. The task order of the three experimental blocks in the cued categorization 
task was counterbalanced in an ABC-CAB-BCA design between subjects, respectively. 
Within each single block, participants completed twenty trials. For the mixed block, thirty 
stay trials, twenty shift trials and twenty baseline trials were presented randomly mixed. 
 
6.3 Results 
We used the same K scores as in Experiment 1 to estimate individual variations in WM 
capacity. Based on a new median split, participants were divided into high and low WM 
subgroups with mean K scores of 4.69 (SD = .53, range 3.90-5.70) and 3.17 (SD = .53, 
range 2.00-3.80) for high and low WM individuals, respectively. 
 
6.3.1 Cued Categorization Task 
The analogous analysis as Experiment 1 was conducted for the mixed block condition. 
The pattern of results is summarized in Figure 6.2. The two-way interaction of SOA and 
WM capacity was marginally significant, F(1, 33) = 3.14, p < .09, p
2
 = .09. Again, 
whereas, high WM individuals performed equally well independently of SOA (F < 1.00), 
low WM individuals improved their performance at long relative to short SOAs, 
F(1, 33) = 10.44, p < .01. Again, this effect is mainly due to shift trials.  
For low WM capacity participants, a short SOA impaired performance strongly in shift 
trials, t( 33) = 4.16, p < .01. Compared to Experiment 1 high WM capacity individuals 
also performed less accurate on shift trials with a short SOA, t(33) = 1.72, p < .05, but the 
impairment was still smaller compared to low WM capacity individuals, t(33) = 1.90, 
p < .05. The differences between the long and short SOA for shift trials tended to be 
greater for those participants with low WM capacity relative to those with high WM 
capacity, t(33) = 1.89, p < .07. 
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The second analysis was conducted to examine individual differences when it was not 
necessary to coordinate or reconfigure different task sets. If the effects found in the mixed 
blocks are caused by task set reconfiguration costs, we should find no or smaller capacity-
related individual differences in single task blocks. The pattern of accuracy is shown in 
Figure 6.3. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Accuracy data in the cued categorization task of Experiment 2 as 
a function of cue and SOA for both WM capacity groups; error bars 
represent plus or minus one standard error of the mean. 
 
First, we entered accuracy on stay blocks in an ANOVA with SOA (300, 450 ms) as 
within subject factor and WM capacity (low, high) as between subject factor. There were 
no significant effects or interactions (largest F-value F(1, 33) = 1.47, p = .23). The 
analogous analysis was done for single shift blocks. It revealed a significant main effect 
of SOA, F(1, 33) = 8.34, p < .01, indicating greater accuracy on trials with long than short 
SOA. Although the interaction was not significant, the main effect for SOA goes mainly 
back to low WM participants. Low WM participants performed less accurately on trials 
with short than long SOA, t(33) = 2.51, p < .01. Although we found the same tendency 
for high WM participants, t(33) = 1.54, p < .07, the reduction in accuracy with short SOA 
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tended to be smaller relative to low WM participants, t(33) = 1.46, p < .08. An additional 
planned comparison between performance in shift trials on single compared to mixed 
blocks revealed that performance on single shift blocks is clearly higher regardless of 
SOA and WM capacity, F(1, 33) = 19.65, p < .01. 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Accuracy data as a function SOA for both WM capacity groups in single blocks of 
Experiment 2; error bars represent plus or minus one standard error of the mean. A Accuracy 
pattern in the stay block B Accuracy data in the shift block. 
 
Since in Experiment 2 we also found costs for high WM capacity in shift (as opposed to 
only stay) blocks, we conducted a post hoc comparison of costs in shift trials for 
Experiments 1 and 2. Figure 6.4 summarizes the time dependent shift trial costs, which 
were calculated as difference in performance between long and short SOA. In Experiment 
1 as well as in the mixed block of Experiment 2 low WM capacity individuals showed 
larger costs in performing shift trials relative to high WM capacity individuals 
(Experiment 1, t(33) = 1.69, p < .05; mixed block Experiment 2, t(33) = -1.90, p < .05). 
By contrast, in the single shift block of Experiment 2 the same tendency was seen but it 
was reduced and no longer significant, t(33) = -0.82, p >  10. These results indicate that 
individual variations in WM capacity related to voluntarily engaging attention are more 
pronounced in conditions where different functions of cognitive control (target selection 
and task set coordination) have to be executed. 
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Figure 6.4. Mean difference in shift trials for 
high and low WM participants of Experiments 
1 and 2 (Standard error of means in 
parentheses). Shift trial costs have been 
calculated as difference in shift trials between 
long and short SOA. Positive values indicate 
costs. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to specify whether or not general task set 
reconfiguration costs contributed to reduced performance of low WM capacity 
individuals obtained in the cued categorization task of Experiment 1. Participants 
therefore underwent trials with single and mixed trial order. For the mixed task set, we 
replicated our previous finding from Experiment 1 that low WM capacity individuals take 
longer to voluntarily allocate attention (shift trials). However, with the longer interval 
between cue and target display low WM capacity individuals were able overcome these 
costs. Unexpectedly, we now also found costs for high WM participants on shift trials. 
Compared to Experiment 1, the task requirements in this variant of the cued 
categorization task prohibited alternative task solving strategies, such as retroactively 
inferring which square was indicated as target. This suggests that if the task structure is 
more demanding, high WM capacity individuals also come at cost. Nevertheless, relative 
to participants with low WM capacity the time dependent costs were much smaller for 
high WM capacity individuals. Furthermore, and more importantly, performance in shift 
trials on single compared to mixed block was much better. When the entire block could 
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be processed with the same task set, no time dependent differences in shift trial costs 
between high and low WM capacity individuals on single blocks were present. This 
supports our hypothesis that if the task demands did not require task set reconfiguration 
processes, individual differences involving WM capacity were reduced.  
By definition task rules set up the frames for cognitive control processes that perceptual 
and categorical filter are later operating on (Bundesen, 1990). If participants are prepared 
that competitors for limited processing resources might appear, they boost processing of 
the task relevant items so that they win the race for representation. In contrast, the gate 
should be closed when a competitor has been selected (Olivers & Meeter, 2008). Thus, 
setting up a proper task set should facilitate item selection in the face of interference. In 
our cued categorization tasks the change in task set was explicitly signaled by a cue. If the 
task set still needed to be adapted before a proper response could be initiated we would 
expect more inaccurate performance on trials with short SOA. This was exactly what we 
found for participants with low WM capacity on shift trials. Note that, on stay trials 
updating the task set was not required for accurate performance. Behavior guided by the 
proper task rule or prepotent response would have led to the same response.  
Before cognitive control can operate, the need for its intervention has to be detected 
(Botvinick, Braver, & Barch, 2001). Recently, Liesefeld et al. (2014) could show such a 
link between the initiation of higher executive control and the detection of control 
demands. More importantly, the magnitude of the implementation of executive control 
was positively correlated with WM capacity and negatively with the amount of irrelevant 
information being stored. Thus, we hypothesized that one central mechanism associated 
with the implementation of cognitive control, is the detection and activation of task set 
reconfiguration and that variations in WM capacity could be explained in terms of 
differences in latency of this configuration process. Experiment 2 supported this idea. In 
conditions where no task set reconfiguration was required, costs in voluntary selection 
processes were reduced. In the next part of the thesis, we further developed the idea 
whether deficits in cognitive flexibility are associated with individual differences in 
efficient WM functioning by investigating individual differences in unnecessary storage 
costs. 
It is important to note that, individual differences in the ability to reconfigure task sets 
cannot account for all WM capacity related effects we found in Experiment 2. On single 
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shift blocks, wherein there was no need to reconfigure the task set, accuracy in trials with 
short SOAs was still reduced to greater extent as for those individuals with low relative to 
high WM capacity, supporting the idea that individual differences in WM capacity are 
also correlated with variations in the efficiency of orienting attention towards task 
relevant information. Thus, we believe that the differences in WM capacity found in 
mixed blocks of our cued categorization tasks are reflective of individual differences in 
orienting attention and coordination changing task requirements. 
We have thus far interpreted our findings such that participants with low WM capacity 
were less effective to employ voluntary control processes and they were also slower in 
doing so compared with those participants with high WM capacity. An alternative view 
considers our results in the context of attentional disengagement. According to this 
perspective, the pattern of findings might not exclusively depend on differences in 
voluntary engagement of attention, but rather in the time individuals need to disengage 
attention once it has been captured (in this case by the cue). In our cued categorization 
task, attention must be clearly engaged and oriented towards the cue in order to process 
its information. This is true for both stay and shift trials because in both cases, 
participants have to use the information of the cue to voluntarily allocate attention to the 
target’s location. Only in shift trials, however, individuals are required to disengage their 
focus of attention from the cue first to allocate their attention towards the target. Thus, the 
necessity to disengage attention from its current position goes hand in hand with 
voluntarily engaging attention to targets.  
In Chapter 5 we have already reviewed that especially low WM capacity individuals are 
limited in rapidly disengaging attention from processing information when it has been 
engaged by a specific stimulus (Cashdollar et al., 2013; Fukuda & Vogel, 2011). 
However, individuals with high and low WM capacity do not always differ in the 
magnitude of attention capture. In both Cashdollar et al.’s and Fukuda and Vogel’s 
studies the disengagement effect was not shown on just any information but only when 
the distractor shared the target defining feature, such as color. Those distractors that were 
presented in different colors did not slow down attentional disengagement. Thus, 
individual differences in WM capacity were only associated with delayed disengagement 
upon target feature contingent capture. The time attention is engaged on a specific 
stimulus depends critically on the attributes for which attention is set (e.g. Folk et al., 
1992; Folk & Remington, 2006). According to this logic, congruent cues on the target’s 
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selection property should produce disengagement cost only. This was not the case in our 
cued categorization task. Here, the target defining feature was its position and in the shift 
condition cue and target never shared the target defining property, because target and shift 
cue were never displayed at the same location. In other words, although participants 
needed to engage in the processing of the cue information, and as a consequence in shift 
trials disengage their attention first from the cue’s position, the magnitude of this effect 
should not differ between high and low WM capacity individuals. Thus, we believe that 
our findings of Experiment 1 and 2 are reflective of individual variations in orienting 
attention towards targets rather than disengaging it from the cue. 
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Part 3 
Cognitive Control and Unnecessary Storage 
in Working Memory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Cognitive Control Processes in General 
Cognitive control is of central importance in everyday activities. For example, when we 
are driving to work in the morning, we have to plan the best route, but flexibly change the 
route when the street is suddenly blocked due to road works. All these different subtasks 
must be monitored and solved appropriately to ensure that we arrive on work in time. 
Even carrying out simple actions like making a cup of coffee necessitates a set of 
effective cognitive operations such as putting coffee instead of a tea bag into the mug or 
boiling the water before pouring it into the cup together with the coffee. Without 
question, such actions require setting and carrying out goals and to avoid being distracted 
by competing alternatives. Cognitive control processes are assumed to ensure this. They 
operate in service of task sets and refer to a wide range of mental operations and strategic 
processes to ensure goal-directed behavior. This is what Baddeley and Hitch (1974) 
called central executive, and what Norman and Shallice (1986) labeled the supervisory 
attention system. Thus, specific processes, such as cognitive flexibility or selective 
attention, can be functionally integrated into the broader concept of cognitive control 
(Miyake et al., 2000).  
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The complexity of cognitive control is most evident when we make mistakes. For 
example, when we go into the kitchen to make a cup of coffee and end up doing 
something else instead or when we pick up our coat to go out when the phone starts 
ringing and then end up going out without our coat on. Given the broad impact of 
cognitive control, deficits in cognitive control might account for many types of failures 
within the cognitive system. From this viewpoint, lapses in specific attentional processing 
components like selective attention might be a result of the absence of cognitive control 
in general rather than deficits in within its specific components. The question of whether 
lapses in selective attention are due to deficits of cognitive control in general or more 
specific aspects within cognitive control (e.g., engagement of attention) and its 
relationship to individual differences in WM capacity and effective WM functioning will 
be more deeply evaluated in this part of the thesis.  
Briefly stated, we investigate whether optimal WM functioning is associated with the 
ability to monitor and coordinate the implementation of the correct task set or the ability 
to operate on specific elementary selection processes. We reason that individual 
variations in WM capacity are reflective of general abilities to exert cognitive control 
rather than variations within specific processes. In fact, attention as well as WM are 
assumed to rely on general cognitive control processes (Engle & Kane, 2004; Kane & 
Conway, 2007). Evidence for this, was revealed in several types of cognitive tasks with 
minimal memory requirements but high demands on cognitive control. As detailed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, it has been found that association between WM capacity and selective 
attention are most pronounced whenever the current task goal competes with the more 
habitual response (Hutchison, 2011; Kane & Engle, 2003; Redick & Engle, 2011; Redick, 
2014; Unsworth et al., 2004). Our results of Experiment 2 extend this idea by showing 
that variations in WM capacity are associated with the specific ability to control the 
attentional allocation towards relevant information and the general ability to flexibly 
switch and coordinate changing task demands.  
Engle et al. (1999) even go further and suggest that any WM task also contains 
components of cognitive control like blocking interference or other aspects of controlled 
attention. In the next chapter, we develop three different possibilities of the role of 
cognitive control in performing change detection tasks with distractor-present trials as 
described in Chapter 4.2 and analyze how modulations of cognitive control contribute to a 
better understanding of individual differences in WM capacity. 
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7.1 Neglected Interactions of Cognitive Control Processes in 
Change Detection Tasks 
Previously, it has been shown that individuals with high and low WM capacity differ in 
their ability to control what information will be maintained in WM (Jost et al., 2011; 
Liesefeld et al., 2014; McNab & Klingberg, 2008; Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005). 
People who are able to retain more objects in WM are also more efficient in gating 
relevant items. However, we believe that these findings may require a more complex 
explanation. In accordance with Engle et al. (1999) we argue that adding distractor-
present trials in a standard change detection task increases the involvement of cognitive 
control in general. Thus, variations in unnecessary storage costs – an indicator for optimal 
WM functioning – might be reflective of variations in different cognitive control abilities. 
We see at least two different components of cognitive control involved while performing 
change detection tasks and we will describe the dynamic interplay in the following. 
 
The Influence of Cognitive Flexibility 
First, in the standard change detection task with selection demands (Jost et al., 2011; 
Liesefeld et al., 2014; Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005), participants in different trial 
types in principle have to perform two different tasks. In one task, participants are 
required to select a subset of relevant items out of an array consisting of relevant and 
irrelevant items while on the other task no selection processes are required and all items 
must be stored. Each task is associated with a certain task set defining the appropriate 
processes. However, by definition only one task set can be active at a certain time and 
people have to continuously switch back and forth between those (see Chapter 6.1; 
Olivers & Meeter, 2008). Thus, another way of looking at the study design is from a dual-
task perspective. From this perspective, changing demands require flexibility of cognitive 
control processes and participants show costs in performance whenever the task set must 
be alternated. Since the frequency of distractor-present trials is lower relative to pure-
target trials, performance costs due to task set coordination should be most evident in 
distractor-present trials. From this viewpoint, it is likely that the general ability to switch 
efficiently between different task sets might contribute to unnecessary storage costs as 
described above.  
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Central to the ability of task set reconfiguration is whether the task change can be 
anticipated or if it comes by surprise. Typically, the more time people have to prepare for 
an upcoming task switch, the less costs on performance are found (Meiran, 1996). 
Furthermore, and more importantly, it has been shown that when participants know prior 
to the target display which task they are required to execute, performance sharply 
increases (Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000). However, in the standard change detection 
task with distractor-present trials the actual task set can first be identified when the-to-be 
memorized stimuli are present. Only at this point participants are able to discriminate 
between trials where selection processes are relevant or not. Thus, the timing of task set 
reconfiguration strongly depends on the distractors’ presence itself and its detection. In 
other words, in order to stop the processing of distractor items, their presence has to be 
detected first. Recently, Liesefeld et al. (2014) found evidence for such a causal chain of 
the initiation of selection mechanisms and the timing of distractor detection in a change 
detection task. Furthermore, and more importantly, individuals with high and low WM 
capacity differed in the time needed for distractor detection, with low WM capacity 
individuals taking longer in doing so than high WM capacity individuals. In this view, 
unnecessary storage costs should be reduced when participants know which task to 
execute prior to the onset of the memory array. We addressed this question in 
Experiment 3. 
 
Controlling for Different Dynamics of Cognitive Control 
In Experiment 4 we further evaluated whether unnecessary storage costs are not due to 
the fact that participants need to coordinate two task sets per se, but rather due to the 
amount of cognitive load that causes increased interference from irrelevant distractors. 
This question taps into different dynamics of cognitive control. According to Lavie and 
colleagues’ load theory of selective attention (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004; 
Lavie, 2005, 2010), selective attention consists of two mechanisms: an early, passive and 
a second goal-directed mechanism. The latter one ensures that attended but irrelevant 
information does not enter WM and is considered to be an active, cognitive process. 
However, its effectiveness depends on cognitive load. If cognitive load is high and most 
of a person’s cognitive capacity is consumed, only few resources are left for selective 
attention. Thus, distractors might be privileged for processing and enter WM. A person, 
however, is more efficient in controlling goal-directed processing of relevant stimuli in 
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situations under low cognitive load. Thus, the larger the cognitive load, the less efficient 
selective attention operates. This effect has been found for different types of load (Lavie 
et al., 2004).  
For instance, there is a high load on cognitive control when people are engaged in dual-
tasks. Here, people have to switch constantly between different task sets. If the task 
demands changes, the old task set must be suppressed and the new task set and its 
corresponding processes are activated and initiated (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This 
coordination process imposes a high load on the general cognitive control component of 
cognitive flexibility. Studies using such load manipulations have revealed that 
interference of irrelevant distraction as measured by response competition is larger in 
condition with high cognitive load (Lavie et al., 2004). It has further been shown that a 
reduction on performance in a WM task (complex span task) increases as a function of 
the number of task switches (Liefooghe et al., 2008). Hence, imposing load on cognitive 
control like it is the case in multi-task coordination decreases the effectiveness of 
selective attention. Both processes therefore seem to recruit the same resources. In 
Experiment 2 of this dissertation project, we could further show that the magnitude of 
target selection costs is not only modulated by cognitive load but is also associated with 
individual differences in WM capacity. More precisely, we found that load on cognitive 
control in form of the requirement of task set coordination (as in mixed vs. single task 
blocks) reduced to a greater extent the efficiency of selective attention for low than high 
WM capacity individuals (see Chapter 6).  
This raises the question whether optimal WM functioning is modulated by cognitive load, 
with higher cognitive load leading to unnecessary storage of irrelevant information. Thus, 
selection mechanisms can only operate upon their full potential if processing resources 
are still available. In change detection tasks with distractor-present trials the size of 
cognitive load is high. People are required to monitor and coordinate different task sets 
(cognitive flexibility) as well as to initiate specific selection mechanisms (target 
selection), if needed. Important in this respect is that both processes share the same 
resources, but that the processing of distractors can only be stopped if the appropriate task 
set has been previously activated. If most cognitive resources are already consumed at the 
moment of target selection by task set specification, only few resources are left to stop 
distractor processing. In this view, any drop in WM performance in distractor-present 
trials would be because both control processes – task set coordination and target selection 
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– push cognitive control to its limits. Thus, reducing load on cognitive control processes 
in general should lower unnecessary storage costs in WM performance. From this view, 
optimal WM functioning might depend on the availability of overall cognitive control 
functions at the moment of selection. 
 
Testing the Influence of Speed of Cognitive Control 
Closely intertwined with the relationship between task set reconfiguration and selective 
attention is the sequential organization of both processes. Before selection mechanism can 
be initiated, the accurate task set has to be reactivated. From this view, the timing of 
selection processes depends strongly on the speed of task set coordination. Any delays in 
task set reconfiguration would impede selective attention, therefore causing greater 
interference. Evidence from a dual-task paradigm with varied intervals between cue and 
stimulus presentation supports this idea. Here, reduced task switching costs have been 
found with prolonged cue-stimulus intervals, indicating that task set coordination takes 
time (Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In Experiment 2 of this dissertation 
project we could further show that WM capacity is correlated with individual differences 
in the speed of this coordination process. The group differences we uncovered suggest 
that low WM capacity individuals take more time in task set reconfiguration compared to 
high WM capacity individuals (as in mixed vs. single task blocks; see Chapter 6). In 
Experiment 5, we set out to investigate whether variations in speed of task set 
configuration are associated with differences in WM capacity.  
 
     8 Experiment 3 | 63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Experiment 3: Cognitive Flexibility and 
Unnecessary Storage Costs 
8.1 Introduction 
The ability to process or select relevant information at the expense of irrelevant 
information is critical for adequate WM functioning. As detailed in Chapter 4, WM has a 
very limited online capacity. Thus, one important aspect of efficient WM functioning 
involves controlling what information is maintained, by prioritizing task relevant 
information consistent with current task goals. Cognitive control is assumed to operate in 
service of these task goals. If individuals are less efficient in implementing the 
reconfiguration of appropriate task sets, the initiation of specific attentional processes 
associated with a certain task set will be delayed. In fact, in a typical change detection 
task with distractors, both processes are closely intertwined. As detailed in Chapter 7.1, at 
the onset of the memory array the implementation of the appropriate task set will be 
initiated. However, that is the same time when the corresponding selection processes are 
already required. Therefore, any deficits in reconfiguring the appropriate task set might 
impair the initiation of selection processes in distractor-present trials and increase 
interference. Moreover, it has been shown that individuals with high and low WM 
capacity differ in the ability to set the appropriate task set upon task contexts (see Chapter 
5.4; Hutchison, 2011; Kane & Engle, 2003; Redick, 2014), with low WM capacity 
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individuals taking longer to specify it relative to high WM capacity individuals (see 
Chapter 6.4; Liesefeld et al., 2014). A critical issue, therefore, concerns whether the 
efficiency of WM functioning can be improved by contextually aiding task set 
reconfiguration processes. The main aim of Experiment 3 was to explore whether 
unnecessary storage costs in low WM capacity individuals are due to such deficits in 
coordinating different task sets – especially if the task demands are high – rather than 
selection mechanism per se. Specifically, we wanted to evaluate whether unnecessary 
storage costs in low WM capacity individuals can be reduced by allowing participants to 
set the appropriate processes prior to the onset of the memory array. We recorded 
behavioral and electrophysiological data to analyze selection efficiency in high and low 
WM capacity individuals. 
The experimental procedures we used were similar to previous ERP research 
investigating the influence of selective attention on WM performance (Vogel, 
McCollough, et al., 2005). On each trial, a bilateral memory array containing of different 
colored rectangles were presented briefly. On some trials, the targets were displayed 
among distractors. After a retention period, memory was tested by showing a single item 
per side, and the participants had to state whether this item was different or the same as 
the item at corresponding position in the memory array. We used single-probe arrays in 
order to reduce comparison processes in the task which are assumed to take place when 
the test array contains the whole array (Kyllingsbaek & Bundesen, 2009).  
To disentangle the role of coordinating changing task requirements and initiating 
selection mechanisms, we used a cueing paradigm with different predictive cue types. 
One cue type just signaled which side of the sample array should be remembered 
(direction cue). This cue type served as baseline. Performance on the task was then 
compared with conditions where the cue type was assumed to reactivate the task set in 
advance by indicating whether or not distractors would be present. In this condition, a 
colored cue was assumed to act as exogenous retrieval cue to reactivate the task set before 
the presentation of the memory array (Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003). In particular, 
we used colored pre-cues as task set reactivation cues. Previous studies on predictive cues 
have already shown improved WM performance following different types of predictive 
cues (Griffin & Nobre, 2003; Linke, Vicente-Grabovetsky, Mitchell, & Cusack, 2011; 
Murray et al., 2011; Schmidt, Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2002). For instance, Schmidt et 
al. (2002) found advantageous effects for WM storage for cued relative to uncued 
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locations. This was even the case when the cued location was not more likely to be 
probed at the test array. More recently, Li and Saiki (2015) further investigated the 
influence of different cue types (color, location) on WM performance. For instance, in 
their experiment 2 they showed beneficial effects for colored pre-cues compared to 
location pre-cues in a change detection task. Prior to the onset of the memory array a 
color or location pre-cue appeared. Color cues indicated a possible change in color at the 
same location and location cues a location change of the same color stimuli as presented 
in the memory array. In order to avoid an instruction bias, participants were told to 
remember both independent of the cue type. They found that WM performance was more 
accurate after color cues than location pre-cues, indicating that colored pre-cues are more 
efficient in modulating WM performance than location pre-cues.  
Drawing upon these findings, we used colored pre-cues displayed in the target color as 
task set reconfiguration cues. We reasoned that the implementation of task set cues 
reduces the load of cognitive control engaged in task set coordination for two reasons. 
First, the task set cue alerted people to prepare for the upcoming trial type (distractor-
present vs. distractor-absent) before the presentation of the memory array. Furthermore, 
and more importantly, displaying the task set cue in the target color refreshed the task 
goal (remember the stimuli presented in the target color), and therefore was proposed to 
facilitate the processing of task-relevant information (Waszak et al., 2003). Thus, 
comparing trials with and without task set cues should allow us to disentangle the 
intertwined relationship between the efficiency of task set coordination (cognitive 
flexibility) and selection mechanisms. We hypothesized that if low WM capacity 
individuals are less efficient in task set coordination, we would observe increased WM 
performance in distractor-present trials after task set cues relative to sole direction cues. 
Alternatively, if unnecessary storage costs are a result of individual differences in 
selection processes per se, WM performance for low WM capacity individuals in 
distractor-present trials should be independent of cue type and no improvement after task 
set cues should be found. Note that for high WM capacity individuals we did not expect 
to find any unnecessary storage costs, and therefore the task set cue should have no 
influence.  
A second aim of our study was to find electrophysiological correlates of the expected 
behavioral performance patterns. Specifically, we were interested in neural measures of 
optimal WM functioning and attentional selection. To measure electrophysiological 
66 | Individual Differences in Working Memory 
 
 
 
correlates of WM capacity, we relied on CDA amplitude (see Chapter 3). Its amplitude 
has not merely been shown to be sensitive to the amount of information being stored and 
individual differences in WM capacity (Vogel & Machizawa, 2004) but seems also to be 
a powerful ERP component to examine how attention control directs the encoding of 
information into WM (McCollough et al., 2007; Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005). In 
particular, because the amplitude of the CDA is sensitive to the number of items being 
stored, we can use it as an online measure of how much information is currently held in 
WM and compare the amplitude in distractor-present conditions with and without task set 
reactivation. As in previous studies, we expected to find unnecessary storage costs for 
low working memory capacity individuals reflected in CDA patterns. Specifically, we 
hypothesized that CDA amplitude in distractor-present trials should be the same as in the 
pure-target condition with the same amount of stimuli. However, in trials containing task 
set cues, when the reconfiguration of the appropriate task set could be done before the 
memory items appeared, we expected CDA amplitude in distractor-present conditions 
after task set cues to be attenuated relative to sole direction cues. For high WM capacity 
individuals, no unnecessary storage costs were assumed independent of cue type. Thus, 
CDA amplitude in distractor-present trials was always to be identical to CDA amplitude 
in trials in the pure-target condition but with the same amount of targets. 
Finally, related to efficiency of selection mechanisms is the point in time efficiency of 
target selection is apparent We were particularly interested in electrophysiological 
correlates of attention to relevant and irrelevant stimuli during WM encoding. There is 
neural evidence that attention can influence sensory processing as early as 100 to 200 ms 
(P1/ N1). This has been documented in studies showing attentional modulation of spatial 
attention (Luck & Hillyard, 1994), feature selection (Zanto & Gazzaley, 2009) and whole 
objects (Rutman et al., 2010). Specifically, the N1 component seems not only to be 
sensitive to the amount of information being processed (Kursawe & Zimmer, 2015), but 
also to discrimination processes related to spatial as well as feature selection (Hillyard, 
Vogel, & Luck, 1998; Mangun & Hillyard, 1991; Vogel & Luck, 2000). Building on 
these findings, it has been established that early perceptual processes can already 
influence subsequent WM performance. In a study conducted by Zanto and Gazzaley 
(2009) it has been shown that early attentional mechanisms can indeed modulate 
attentional filtering. In their study, EEG was recorded while participants performed a 
serial change detection paradigm. The task contained four sequential apertures of dots: 
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two displays consisted of moving dots and two displays were colored but stable. Selective 
attention was manipulated by instructing participants to remember either the color or 
motion direction and to ignore the other stimuli respectively. The ERPs revealed 
significant early attentional modulation for color (N1) and motion (P1) stimuli. The peak 
of early attentional markers (P1/N1) was larger for relevant compared to irrelevant 
stimuli. 
Interestingly, this effect was significantly attenuated for low compared to high 
performance trials suggesting that early attentional processes do influence WM 
performance. Based on these findings, we reasoned that the N1 component which is 
closely related to early attentional discrimination should be sensitive to deficits in 
selection processes related to WM capacity. We were particularly interested in the 
modulation of the N1 in the hemisphere contralateral to the target, because of the 
laterality of the visual system. That is, relevant items presented in one hemifield of a 
bilateral array should be neurally represented in the contralateral hemisphere. In 
particular, we expected the N1 amplitude in the distractor-present condition to be 
attenuated relative to the set size with the same amount of stimuli but all being targets. 
However, this should only be apparent for high WM capacity individuals. For low WM 
capacity individuals, by contrast, the N1 amplitude should be a function of number of 
stimuli, because we assumed a delayed initiation of selection mechanism due to ongoing 
task set reconfiguration processes. Thus, the N1 amplitude in distractor-present condition 
should be the same as pure-target trials with the same amount of stimuli. Since efficiency 
of task set coordination was assumed to be influenced by task set cues, we expected to 
observe an attenuation in the N1 component in distractor-present trials after task set cues 
for low WM capacity individuals. For high WM capacity individuals no extra reduction in 
N1 amplitude was expected.  
Taken together, the major aim of this study was to address the possibility that selection 
costs on WM performance as found in previous studies might be influenced by individual 
differences in efficiency of cognitive control processes in terms of task set 
reconfiguration. We tested this idea by comparing task conditions where task set 
reconfiguration was aided or not.  
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8.2 Methods 
8.2.1 Participants 
Fifty volunteers from Saarland University were tested and paid eight Euro per hour for 
their participation. All participants in this and the following experiments were right-
handed, had normal color vision (as verified by the Ishihara color vision test; Ishihara, 
1972) and gave written informed consent according to the procedure. One participant was 
excluded due to experimental error. The data collection of one participant was terminated 
by the experimenter noticing he or she was too tired to proceed. Eight participants were 
excluded due to EEG artifacts. The final sample consisted of 40 participants (26 female) 
between 18 and 30 years old (M = 23.73). 
 
8.2.2 Stimuli 
All stimuli were presented against a black background. Cue items subtended a visual 
angle of 0.94° and were presented on the fixation cross. In total three different cue types 
were used. One cue type was displayed in light grey and only indicated the relevant 
hemifield (direction cue). The direction cue was realized for all set sizes and served as 
baseline. Two further cue types additionally contained the color of the targets (pink or 
yellow) and allowed to discriminate between trials with and without distractor at a very 
early stage of the trial procedure (task set cue). For set size two and five, an unfilled 
arrow drawn in the relevant color was shown, whereas in the distractor-present condition 
the arrow was completely filled with the relevant color.  
Each memory item was a rectangle selected from a set of four distinct orientations 
(horizontal, vertical, +45°, -45°). The color of the stimuli was yellow and magenta and 
the assignment of color to targets or distractors was counterbalanced across participants. 
The stimuli appeared in a transparent square (0.65°×0.65°) on an imaginary circle with a 
radius of 3.5° around the center of the screen. Only lateral positions were used with the 
restriction that the closest position was 1.75° away from the perpendicular bisectors of the 
sides. In the right and left hemifield the same number of items was shown on the screen. 
Only one hemifield was relevant at a certain time and at the irrelevant hemifield fillers at 
the corresponding positions has been displayed. For the distractor-present condition, the 
fillers were displayed in the corresponding color relative to the relevant hemifield.  
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Test items were chosen out of the same set of stimuli as the memory items. At the test 
array, two probe items appeared. One probe item was displayed at the same position as 
the memory item which was about to be tested. The other one appeared at the irrelevant 
hemifield in relation to the probe item. On change trials, the probe item was different as 
the memory item.  
 
 
Figure 8.1. Schematic illustration of the procedure of Experiment 3. Depicted is a distractor-
present trial with task set cue. 
 
8.2.3 Procedure 
Participants performed a visual bilateral change detection task (see Figure 8.1). Each trial 
began with central fixation. After a jittered delay of 300-500 ms, the cue display appeared 
for 300 ms. The cue was either predictive on the upcoming task set or only indicated the 
relevant hemifield. In 50% of the trials the cue pointed to the left or the right side, 
respectively. A blank fixation screen followed for a random time ranging from 800 to 
1200 ms. The prolonged cue-to-memory interval, compared to previous studies (e.g.; 
Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005), should guarantee that all sensory persistence of the cue 
was eliminated and would not influence early sensory markers of the memory display 
(Irwin & Yeomans, 1986). Then the memory array appeared for 200 ms consisting of 
either two targets, five targets or two targets and three distractors per side. After a 
retention period of 1000 ms (containing only the fixation cross), the test array appeared. 
The test display remained for 2500 ms or until the participants’ response, whichever came 
first. To reduce comparison processes in the task which are assumed to take place when 
the test array contains the whole array, we displayed merely one object per side 
(Kyllingsbaek & Bundesen, 2009). Participants were instructed to detect an orientation 
change that occurred in 50% of the trials. The location of the test item was always 
congruent to its position in the corresponding memory array. Subjects pressed one button 
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to indicate whether the test array was the same and another to state a difference. 
Participants were instructed to place priority on accuracy not speed. The assignment of 
response categories (match vs. no match) to the two buttons was counterbalanced across 
subjects. Responses were delivered via a Cedrus Response RB-834 pad. Participants were 
instructed to retain fixation on the cross in the center of the screen to avoid eye 
movements and to reduce blinks during the trial procedure. A inter trial interval of 2000 
ms preceded the next trial. Here, the fixation cross was replaced by an X and participants 
were encouraged to blink preferably during this time.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants performed a minimum of 24 practice 
trials. Following practice, each session consisted of eighteen blocks. Each of these blocks 
consisted of a random mixture of different set sizes (2T, 2T3D, 5T) and pre-cues 
(direction, task set). In total participants performed 720 trials with 60 trials per condition 
consisting of 30 matching and nonmatching trials. Every 40 trials participants could take 
a short break. The whole experiment lasted about 90 minutes. In order to keep the 
motivation of the participants high during the experimental procedure, participants 
received feedback after each break indicating how accurately they responded overall. 
Additionally, in order to increase task engagement, two participants reaching the best 
performance were granted an additional 15€ for their participation.  
 
8.2.4 EEG recording, pre-processing of EEG data and analyses 
EEG was recorded from 32Ag/AgCl active electrodes (Acticap, Brain Products, Munich) 
mounted in an elastic cap. As locations for the electrodes a subset of the International 10-
20 System (Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4, O1, O2) was used plus 
additional nonstandard positions mainly at the posterior and parietal sites (FC5, FC3, 
FCz, FC4, FC6, T7, T8, P7, P8, PO7, PO3, POz, PO4, PO8). The ground electrode was at 
AFz position. All sites were recorded with a left-mastoid reference and referenced off-
line to the average of the left and right mastoids. Vertical and horizontal eye artifacts 
were monitored monocular with one electrode below the right eye and one at the outer 
canthi of the right eye. Correction of eye movements was done according to the method 
described by Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1983). All impedances were kept below 10 
kΩ. Signals were amplified with a DC coupled amplifier (Brain Amps, Brain Products, 
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Munich, Germany). The sampling rate was 1000 Hz with an analog low-pass filter of 250 
Hz. During data recording the active shield function of the Acticap-system was activated 
to suppress noise from the surrounding. To avoid reduction of amplitude of slow wave 
ERP components no high-pass filter was used.  
All preprocessing and further analyses were completed using BrainVision Analyzer 
(Brain Vision, LLC). The EEG was segmented into epochs averaging from -200 to 1200 
ms stimulus-locked to the onset of the memory array. Data were baseline-corrected with 
respect to the 200 ms pre-stimulus interval and off-line low pass filtered at 20Hz, 24 
dB/octave to eliminate high frequency noise in the signal. Epochs containing artifacts, 
missing or incorrect answers were excluded from further analyses. Averages were 
computed for the different set sizes (2T, 2T3D, 5T) and cue types (direction, task set) but 
collapsed across matches and changes because we were interested in the retention 
interval. In this time period participants cannot yet discriminate between both conditions. 
Since we were mostly interested in effects of attentional selection, the presented results 
are quantified on lateral parietal electrode pairs. We used visual inspection to quantify the 
electrode pairs where the effects of interest were most evident. This was the electrode pair 
P3 and P4. We extracted the CDA component as well as N1 component from this 
electrode pair. 
We calculated contralateral and ipsilateral slow potentials for each electrode by averaging 
activity in a way that preserved the spatial positioning of the electrodes relative to the side 
indicated by the cue. Contralateral slow waves were calculated by combining activity 
over right electrodes when the relevant stimuli were presented in the left hemifield (and 
vice versa for the right hemifield). Ipsilateral slow waves were calculated by averaging 
activity over right (left) electrodes when the relevant stimuli were presented in the right 
(left) hemifield. We calculated the difference wave between ipsilateral und contralateral 
slow potentials to quantify the CDA. The time-window we entered in our statistical 
analyses was between 600-900 ms post memory array onset. 
Furthermore, we quantified the amplitude on the visual N1 to the memory array as a 
peak-to-peak amplitude between P1 and N1. For P1 peak detection a time window of 90-
180 ms was used, whereas for detection of the N1 peak amplitude the time window 160 – 
260 ms was used. N1 amplitude was calculated for the contralateral slow waves, because 
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we were only interested in attentional processes related to the hemisphere were the-to-be 
remembered stimuli are presented. 
Behavioral and neural unnecessary storage costs were calculated as the difference 
between set size two and the distractor-present condition. Data were analyzed by a 3-level 
Set size (2T, 2T3D, 5T) × 2-level Cue type (direction cue and task set cue) × 2-level WM 
capacity (high vs. low) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with set size and cue type as 
repeated measures and WM capacity as between subject variable. Two-tailed t tests were 
used for post-hoc analyses. We applied Greenhouse Geisser adjustments for non-
sphericity when appropriate. In this case, the uncorrected degrees of freedom, 
Greenhouse-Geisser coefficient (ε) and corrected probability levels are reported. Further, 
we will not report main effects whenever they are qualified by significant interactions. 
 
8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Behavioral 
For analyses of performance, response accuracy corrected for guessing (PR) was 
calculated as proportion of hits minus proportion of false alarms for each set size and cue 
type (see Chapter 2.3 for further details concerning quantification). The PR-scores for 
different conditions are presented in Figure 8.2. WM capacity was estimated on the basis 
of a linear transformation of the PR-score for set size two and five (as described in 
Chapter 2.3; Cowan et al., 2005; Pashler, 1988). To make the results of our study 
comparable to other studies only trials with cues indicating direction were used to 
estimate each individual’s capacity. We took the maximum WM score from set size two 
or five as estimation of WM. The mean WM capacity estimate was 1.88 (SD = 0.44) 
ranging from .82 to 2.85. For further analyses participants were divided into two groups 
by a median split, high capacity (M = 2.17, SD = 0.38) and low capacity (M = 1.56, SD = 
0.25) individuals respectively. 
The ANOVA yielded a significant interaction effect between cue type and WM capacity, 
F(1, 38) = 4.58, p < .05, ηp
²
 = .11; the interaction between set size and WM capacity 
approached significance, F(2, 76) = 2.83, p = .08, ηp
²
 = .07, ε = .72. To follow up these 
interactions, we first analyzed unnecessary storage costs and compared unnecessary 
storage costs for high and low WM individuals, followed by a comparison of unnecessary 
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storage costs between different cue types. We took the difference between PR-Scores of 
set size two and the distractor-present condition as indicator for unnecessary storage, 
since in both conditions the equal amount of targets was presented. 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Behavioral Results of Experiment 3. PR-Scores as a 
function of set size, cue type and WMC, error bars represent 
plus minus one standard error of the mean. 
 
First, we compared performance on trials with direction cues. As illustrated in Figure 8.2, 
high WM capacity individuals showed no unnecessary storage costs (t < 1.00). By 
contrast, performance for low WM capacity significantly dropped in trials with distractors 
(t(38) = 4.42, p < .001). The difference in the unnecessary storage quantified by 
individuals with high and low WM capacity was significant, t(38) = 2.56, p = .02. Next, 
we checked whether unnecessary storage costs for low WM individuals were reduced in 
trials with goal reactivation, as manipulated by the presence of the task set cue, compared 
to trials without goal reactivation (direction cue). Low WM capacity individuals 
significantly increased WM performance in the distractor-present condition with task set 
cues compared to trials with direction cues, t(38) = 2.36, p = .02. However, task set cues 
did not fully eliminate unnecessary storage costs. The PR-score in the distractor-present 
condition with task set cues was still lower relative to set size two and direction cues (t < 
-1.99, p = .06). For individuals with high WM capacity, performance in the distractor-
present condition was the same independent of the manipulation cue type (t < 1.00). 
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8.3.2 Electrophysiology 
The CDA waveforms for all different conditions are presented in Figure 8.3. The 
analogous statistical analyses as for the behavioral data were conducted. The interaction 
between set size and WM capacity was significant, F(2, 76) = 4.19, p < .05, ηp
²
 = .10. To 
resolve this interaction, we first compared CDA amplitude between set sizes for 
conditions with direction cues only. For high WM capacity individuals, CDA amplitude 
for set size five was larger compared to set size two, t(38) = 2.30, p < .05. CDA amplitude 
for the distractor-present condition and set size two was identical (t < 1.00).  
 
 
Figure 8.3 Grand-averaged ERPs time-locked to the memory array of Experiment 3. Depicted is 
CDA amplitude as a number of set size and cue type for high and low WM capacity individuals. 
Note the negative direction of the y-axis Boxes highlight the time period of interest. 
 
These were the predicted findings and a replication of previous studies. By contrast, for 
low WM individuals CDA amplitude for set size five was identical to set size two (t < 
1.00) and CDA amplitude for the distractor-present condition was larger compared to set 
size two, t(38) = 2.21, p < .05, as well as set size five, t(38) = 2.21, p < .05. For the cue 
type manipulation, no effects yielded significance. 
Early processing stages were indexed by the N1 component as illustrated in Figure 8.4. 
The interaction between WM capacity and set size tended to be significant, F(2, 76) = 
2.58, p = .08, ηp
²
 = .10. As in previous studies, the N1 component was sensitive to the 
amount of sensory information being presented. That is, there was a significant increase 
in peak amplitude from set size two to set size five for both high and low WM capacity 
individuals, t(38) = 4.67, p < .0001, t(38) = 2.41, p < .05.  
   8 Experiment 3 | 75 
 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 8.4, the peak amplitude for high WM capacity individuals was 
attenuated for the distractor-present condition relative to set size five and this reduction 
was significant, t(38) = 2.70, p = .01. This was not the case for participants with low WM 
capacity (t < 1.00). Moreover, the magnitude of the N1 modulation effect (difference 
between set size five and distractor-present condition) was different between the two 
groups, t(38) = 2.00, p = .05. The manipulation of cue type had no influence on the N1 
component.  
 
 
Figure 8.4. Grand-averaged ERPs time-locked to the memory array of Experiment 3. Depicted 
are the contralateral slow waves as a number of set size and cue type for high and low WM 
capacity individuals. The N1 modulation is the difference between distractor-present condition 
and set size five. 
 
8.4 Discussion 
Previous work highlighted that individuals who are able to retain more items are also 
better in controlling the filtering of irrelevant ones (Jost et al., 2011; Liesefeld et al., 
2014; McNab & Klingberg, 2008; Vogel, McCollough, et al., 2005). However, the 
unnecessary storage of irrelevant information may not be due to deficits in specific 
selection mechanisms per se, but may be reflective of individual variations in the 
efficiency of cognitive flexibility related to WM capacity (see Experiment 2; Lavie et al., 
2004). Our major aim was to test this hypothesis. Behaviorally, our results reflected the 
predicted findings. For high WM capacity individuals, we found no reduction in WM 
performance in the distractor-present condition relative to set size two, indicating that 
they were able to efficiently control the storage of relevant information. This finding was 
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independent of cue type. By contrast, WM performance for low WM individuals was 
significantly impaired in distractor-present conditions relative to set size two indicating 
that they were unnecessarily storing more information than required. After the 
presentation of the task set cue, WM performance in distractor-present condition relative 
to conditions where the cue solely indicated direction was improved. However, some 
residual costs remained. 
One possible explanation for such residual costs is that individuals with high and low 
WM capacity differ in both the coordination of task sets and the initiation of specific 
selection mechanisms, with low WM capacity individuals being less efficient in both 
processes. However, we believe that low WM capacity individuals are not per se less 
efficient in selection mechanisms. Alternatively, we reason that at the moment of target 
selection low WM capacity individuals might have already consumed most of their 
resource capacities. Thus, only few resources would be left to stop the processing of 
distractors and some distractors could have entered WM. Unnecessary storage costs after 
task set cues would not be abolished but reduced. Important in this respect is that 
selection processes can only be initiated when the appropriate task set has been 
reconfigured. This implies that cognitive control processes are at least to some extent 
sequentially organized and that cognitive flexibility and selective attention both share the 
same resources. This interpretation is supported by the load theory of selective attention 
developed by Lavie and colleagues (see Chapter 8.1; Lavie et al., 2004; Lavie, 2005, 
2010). In this model, active selective attention processes are influenced by cognitive load. 
In conditions of high cognitive load, interference effects caused by irrelevant information 
are much more likely. This effect has been shown for different types of cognitive load, 
with dual-task coordination being one of them (Lavie et al., 2004). Therefore, this model 
might also apply to a change detection task with distractor-present trials being added. The 
mixed trial structure requires the cognitive system to switch flexibly between tasks where 
all items, or only a subset of items (distractor-present trials), are targets. Thus, cognitive 
load is high, especially in distractor-present trials where both cognitive processes – task 
set coordination and selection mechanisms – are required. Consequently, when a series of 
varying operations that load heavily on cognitive control, less time and resources are left 
for memory encoding and maintenance. If individuals with low WM capacity are 
generally less efficient in controlling limited cognitive resources, only few resources 
would be left for selection processes, which in turn causes greater interference from 
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distractors. In Experiment 4 we further explored whether WM costs in distractor-present 
trials after task set reactivation cues are due to deficits in selection processes or the size of 
cognitive load. In order to make sure that at the moment of target selection resource 
capacities would be sufficient, we reduced set size. We further implemented pure, or 
single, distractor-present blocks. In single distractor blocks no additional demands on 
cognitive control besides selection are imposed. If our hypothesis regarding cognitive 
load is true, selection processes should operate on their full potential in single distractor 
blocks and under small set sizes. 
A second aim of Experiment 3 was to find electrophysiological correlates for our 
behavioral results. As reflection of WM maintenance we used CDA amplitude. For 
participants with high WM we found the predicted findings. The amplitude of the CDA 
for set size two was identical to the distractor-present condition indicating that high WM 
capacity individuals efficiently controlled the gating of relevant information into WM. By 
contrast, for low WM capacity individuals the results of CDA amplitude were not in line 
with our predictions. Although CDA amplitude for the distractor-present condition was 
larger relative to set size two, the amplitude of set size five was reduced. In fact, CDA 
amplitude for set size five was identical to set size two. The latter aspect is in accordance 
with the slot model, if one considers that CDA amplitude should reach a stable plateau 
when set size reaches an individual’s capacity. Since the mean K-score of low WM 
capacity individuals was below two on the average no further increase of the CDA would 
be expected.  
However, the CDA in the distractor present condition went more negative than in the 
other two conditions which contradicts the prediction. We therefore took a closer look at 
the slow potentials of which the CDA as a difference wave is calculated in order to check 
whether the distractor effect may be caused by ipsilateral effects. To ensure that no 
encoding effects are included in the analysis, we used a time window between 800 and 
1000 ms. We found no significant difference at the ipsilateral slow potentials for low WM 
capacity individuals (F < 1.00; see Table 14.1), suggesting that increases in CDA 
amplitude in the distractor-present condition goes mainly back to more negative going 
contralateral slow potentials (see Figure 8.4). One possible explanation for this is that 
individuals were actually able to retain more items than CDA amplitude for set size five 
indicates. From this point of view, WM capacity in supra capacity set sizes would 
overload WM functioning and underestimate a person’s real capacity limits. Recent 
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findings indicating an decrease in estimated WM capacity for low WM capacity 
individuals when the memory array contains high set sizes (Fukuda, Woodman, & Vogel, 
2015; Linke et al., 2011) support this notion. Drawn upon this, we expected a more valid 
reflection of a person’s real capacity limit, in Experiment 4 with reduced set sizes near to 
a person’s capacity limit. 
Furthermore, in Experiment 3 we aimed to test whether differences in efficiency of 
cognitive control are associated with the ability to utilize selection mechanisms at an 
initial stage of processing. We used the N1 component as an indicator for such early 
discrimination processes. Our analyses of N1 peaks showed that its amplitude increased 
with set size. The more visual information was presented, the larger the amplitude of the 
N1 (Ko et al., 2014; Kursawe & Zimmer, 2015). Importantly, its amplitude was 
modulated by WM capacity. High WM capacity individuals showed a clear attenuation of 
peak amplitude of the distractor-present condition relative to set size five, participants 
with low WM capacity did not. Both conditions displayed the same amount of visual 
information but differed in the amount of relevant items. The attenuation in amplitude in 
the distractor-present condition can be interpreted as an indicator for early attention 
selection mechanisms. It is consistent with previous findings and has been taken as 
evidence for the suppression of irrelevant information (Gulbinaite, Johnson, De Jong, 
Morey, & Van Rijn, 2014; Rutman et al., 2010; Zanto & Gazzaley, 2009). 
However, task set cues relative to direction cues did not lead to a more effective 
prioritization of relevant information for individuals with low WM capacity. We found no 
differences in N1 peaks between set size five and the distractor-present condition 
independent of the cue type. One possible explanation is that early selection mechanisms 
are traits individuals high and low WM capacity differ in. Thus, the environmental 
context, such as task set cues, would have no influence on the efficiency of sensory target 
selection. Alternatively and in line with our previous argument, we reason that at the 
moment of initial target selection, the amount of cognitive resources left for distractor 
detection was not sufficient for individuals with low WM capacity. If this is true, low 
WM capacity individuals should be able to implement early selection processes when 
demands on cognitive control are reduced. In Experiment 4 we further evaluated this idea. 
 
     9 Experiment 4 | 79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Experiment 4: Impacts of Cognitive Load  
9.1 Introduction 
As in Experiment 3, we were interested in comparing distractor-present conditions with 
and without early task set reactivation but with smaller set sizes lower than or close to the 
individual’s resource capacity. As we had reasoned, we may have found residual selection 
costs in participants with low WM capacity because task demands in Experiment 3 
overloaded their cognitive functioning. Even task demands in the easiest task condition 
were already too high. We believe that the same argument accounts for the fact that we 
found no electrophysiological correlates of sensory target selection. In order to test this 
idea, we used an identical task design as in Experiment 3 with reduced set sizes. Pure-
target trials only consisted of only one or three targets and distractor-present trials of one 
target and two distractors. We hypothesized that under conditions of low cognitive load 
(reduced set size and task set cues) low WM capacity individuals should show an 
improvement in performance and an attenuation in CDA amplitude in the distractor-
present condition with task set cues relative to distractor-present trials with direction cues. 
For the N1 component we also expected an attenuation of the N1 component in distractor-
present trials for low WM capacity individuals with task set cues. Our hypotheses for 
high WM capacity individuals were identical to those of Experiment 3. Additionally, we 
implemented single distractor blocks. The general logic was that in single distractor 
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blocks the task context remains the same, so no additional strain on cognitive control was 
present besides the initiation of selection processes, and therefore cognitive load should 
be reduced. We argued that in single distractor blocks, no unnecessary storage costs 
should be found for both high and low WM capacity individuals because the task set does 
not have to be reconfigured, and thus, cognitive flexibility and selective attention 
mechanism at the moment of target selection would not overlap in first place. For the N1 
component, we expected the same modulations as for those trials with task set cues for 
low WM capacity individuals. High WM capacity individuals were supposed to show an 
attenuation in the N1 component regardless of whether cognitive control was aided (task 
set cue, block) or not (direction cue). 
 
9.2 Methods 
Except as noted below, all details were identical to Experiment 3. 
 
9.2.1 Participants 
Twenty new subjects (10 female), between 18 and 33 years old, participated in this study.  
 
9.2.2 Stimuli and Procedure 
We reduced set size in the pure-target and distractor-present conditions. In the pure-target 
condition, participants had to remember one or three targets displayed in the target color 
(1T and 3T). In the distractor-present condition one target was presented among two 
distractors (1T2D). In order to avoid pop-out effects of the target singleton, the two 
distractors were displayed in different colors (e.g., pink or blue if the target color was 
yellow). Direction cues were realized for all set sizes. Task set cues, however, were 
constrained to distractor-present trials in mixed blocks only.  
Each session consisted of six blocks. Three of these blocks consisted of a random mixture 
of different set sizes (1T, 1T2D, 3T) and cue types (direction cue and task set cue), and 
three blocks of trials only contained targets and distractors (1T2D). In these single 
distractor-blocks the cue only pointed either to the right or left direction and was never 
displayed in the target color. Half of the participants started with mixed blocks and half 
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began with distractor blocks, and these were then alternated. In total participants 
performed 600 trials with all experimental conditions being counterbalanced. Every 24 
trials participants could take a short break. The whole experiment lasted about 75 
minutes. In order to increase task engagement, the feedback about correctness after each 
break was calculated from the preceding block. 
 
9.2.3 Pre-processing of EEG data 
The lateral posterior electrodes PO7 and PO8 were used to quantify the 
electrophysiological effects of interest. Here, the effects were most evident. However, 
similar patterns of activation were observed over neighboring electrode positions. For P1 
peak detection a time window of 90-220 ms was used, whereas for detection of the N1 
peak amplitude the time window 160-280 ms was used. The time window for CDA 
analyses was the same as in Experiment 3. 
 
9.3 Results 
Since sample size in Experiment 4 was smaller, we had fewer clearly high and low WM 
performers and therefore used repeated-measure analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to 
quantify the influence of WM capacity on unnecessary storage costs and cue efficiency. 
In all analysis WM capacity was included as covariate. However, using a median split and 
calculating an ANOVA yielded to qualitatively analogous results.  
 
9.3.1 Behavioral 
The mean WM capacity was 2.03 (SD = 0.40) ranging from 1.32 to 2.67. We first 
analyzed effects of set size on WM capacity. We conducted an ANCOVA with 3-level 
Set size (1T, 1T2D, 3T) as within-subject factor, but included distractor-present trials 
with direction cues only. We excluded distractor-present trials of task set cues and single 
distractor blocks, because we expected performance in these conditions to be higher 
compared to direction cues, and therefore overshadow the predicted reduction in 
distractor-present trials for low WM capacity if cognitive control is not aided. The results 
are illustrated in Figure 9.1 A. The interaction between set size and WM capacity was 
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significant, F(2, 36) = 167.06, p < .001, ηp
²
 = .09. As in Experiment 3, performance in 
distractor-present trials compared to pure-target trials consisting of one target dropped 
significantly, t(19) = 2.65, p < .05, and, more importantly, the difference between 
distractor-present and pure-target trials correlated negatively with WM capacity, r(20) = -
.53, p < .05, suggesting that low WM capacity individuals were unnecessarily storing also 
irrelevant items (Figure 9.1 B).  
 
 
Figure 9.1. Behavioral Results of Experiment 4. A PR-Scores as a function of set size and 
contextual support after controlling for WMC differences, error bars represent plus minus one 
standard error of the mean B Correlation between the unnecessary storage, as indicated by 
positive values, and WMC. Due to two visually inspected outliers we additionally used spearman 
rank correlation which is assumed to be insensitive to outliers. The respective correlation was 
rSpearman = -.57, p < .01. 
 
Next, we checked whether performance improved in distractor-present trials when 
cognitive control was aided (cue, block) compared to distractor-present trials with 
direction cues which provided less support for cognitive control. In order to do so, we 
conducted an ANCOVA with 3-level Contextual support (Performance in distractor-
present trials with support: single distractor-present block and task set cue vs. 
performance without support: direction cues). The interaction between contextual support 
and WM capacity was significant, F(2, 36) = 3.41, p < .05, ηp
²
 = .16. Performance in 
distractor-present trials increased in conditions with contextual support (block or cue) 
compared to trials without contextual support (direction cues). This was mainly true for 
individuals with low WM capacity. That is, we observed a significant correlation between 
WM capacity and the difference in performance for distractor-present trials with sole 
direction cues and task set cues in mixed blocks, r(20) = -.49, p < .05; as well as a 
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significant correlation between WM capacity and the difference in performance for 
distractor-present trials in mixed blocks with sole direction cues and performance in 
single distractor blocks r(20) = -.47, p < .05 (see Figure 9.2 A/B). 
 
 
Figure 9.2. Improvement in the distractor-present condition after contextual support relative to 
the distractor-condition without support of Experiment 4. Positive values indicate facilitation 
effects. Both correlations remain significant when using Spearman rank correlations (contextual 
cue facilitation effect, rSpearman = -.46; pure distractor block facilitation effect, p < .05, rSpearman = 
-.51, p < .05) A Facilitation effect after task set cues were obtained by subtracting performance 
in distractor-present trials with sole direction cues from performance in distractor-present trials 
with task set cues B Facilitation effect in single blocks were obtained by subtracting 
performance in distractor-present trials with sole direction cues from performance in distractor-
present trials in single distractor blocks. 
 
9.3.2 Electrophysiology 
The analogous analyses as for the behavior were conducted on the ERP amplitudes. For 
CDA amplitude, the interaction between set size and WM capacity approached 
significance, F(2, 36) = 2.80, p < .10, ηp
²
 = .13, ε = .67. The amplitude of the CDA was 
larger for set size three compared to set size one, t(19) = 4.20, p < .001; and the 
distractor-present condition, t(19) = 3.57, p < .01. We found no differences between set 
size one and the distractor-present condition, t < 1.00. In contrast to Experiment 3, 
estimates of WM capacity were only poorly correlated with the electrophysiological 
reflection of unnecessary storage costs (difference between set size one and the distractor-
present condition for direction cues), r(20) = -.28, p = .24. 
Effects of contextual support tended to be significant, F(2, 36) = 2.57, p = .09, ηp
²
 = .13. 
CDA amplitude was more negative after task set cues relative to direction cues, t(19) = 
1.79, p < .09. This increase in CDA amplitude in comparison to direction cues correlated 
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with WM capacity, r(20) = .40, p < .08, suggesting that low WM capacity individuals 
showed a larger difference than high WM capacity individuals (Figure 9.3 A). 
As in Experiment 3, we further quantified this effect by analyzing slow potentials at 
hemispheres contralateral and ipsilateral to the target. For the ipsilateral hemisphere, we 
found a significant negative correlation between the increase in CDA amplitude after task 
set cues relative to direction cues and the decrease in amplitude of slow potentials, r(20) = 
-.66, p < .01. For the analogous comparison at the contralateral hemisphere, no effects 
were found, r(20) = .26, p = .27. These results suggest that the increase in CDA amplitude 
after task set cues is actually a reflection of better filtering of the irrelevant hemifield, and 
not the result of storing more items from the relevant hemifield, as one would assume.  
 
 
Figure 9.3. Grand-averaged ERPs time-locked to the memory array of Experiment 4. A 
Depicted is CDA amplitude as function of set size and contextual support. Note the negative 
direction of the y-axis. Boxes highlight the time period of interest. B Depicted are the 
contralateral slow waves as a function of set size and contextual support. The N1 modulation is 
the difference between distractor-present condition and set size three. 
 
Analysis of the N1 component yielded a significant set size by WM interaction, F(2, 36) 
= 7.20, p < .01, ηp
²
 = .29. The amplitude of the N1 component was influenced by the 
number of relevant stimuli being presented. Set size one differed significantly between 
the distractor-present condition and set size three (t(19) = 5.44, p < .001, t(19) = 7.13, p < 
.001). Moreover, the N1’s peak for set size three was significantly larger compared to the 
distractor-present condition, t(19) = 3.83, p = .001. The magnitude of this attenuation 
effect of the N1 component was not correlated with WM capacity, r(20) = -.09, p = .71, 
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suggesting that all participants applied early selection effects. No additional influences of 
contextual support were found (Fs < 1.00). Note, that no effects on N1 latency yielded a 
significant interaction with WM capacity (Figure 9.3 B).   
 
9.4 Discussion 
The behavioral results of Experiment 4 concur with our previous findings of Experiment 
3. WM capacity was associated with unnecessary storage costs. With increasing estimates 
of WM capacity, the amount of irrelevant information stored in WM decreased. 
Furthermore, and more importantly, when cognitive control processes were aided by 
activating the appropriate task set prior to the onset of the memory array (task set cue) or 
eliminating switching demands between different task sets (single distractor block), 
participants with low WM capacity significantly improved performance in distractor-
present trials, with no difference between task set cue and single distractor block trials. 
This effect was due to a better control of attention allocation. Specifically, after task set 
cues slow potentials at the ipsilateral hemisphere to the target were reduced. Thus, task 
set cues might not have modified the extent to which irrelevant information is suppressed 
per se but instead affected the spatial distribution of attention. Constraining attention to 
relevant information has the advantage that it increases the amount of resources allocated 
to information processing within the focus of attention (Eriksen & James, 1986) while 
outside the focus of attention less processing resources are allocated for processing 
(Handy et al., 2001; Lavie, 1995). In fact, there is accumulating evidence for an inability 
of low WM capacity individuals to effectively allocate attention on relevant information 
(Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012; Heitz & Engle, 2007). In bilateral arrays, items are 
presented in both hemifields and participants have to remember items in the relevant 
hemifield. If controlling the deployment of attention onto the relevant hemifield is what 
impedes individuals with low WM capacity, one would expect to find individual 
differences in electrophysiological reflections of the irrelevant hemifield. This is what 
Fukuda et al. (2015) recently observed. They analyzed slow potentials at hemispheres 
ipsilateral and contralateral to the target separately for high and low WM capacity groups. 
For the contralateral hemisphere, they found no individual differences in amplitude of 
slow waves. By contrast, they observed larger negativity at the ipsilateral hemisphere for 
individuals with low WM capacity relative to high WM capacity individuals. Thus, 
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individuals with low WM capacity seem to be less efficient in allocating attention onto 
the relevant hemifield. As a consequence the irrelevant hemifield will be processed to a 
greater extent and irrelevant and relevant items compete for limited processing resources. 
This is especially likely under conditions of low load, such as when only one target is 
presented like in Experiment 4 (Arend & Zimmer, 2011). When load is low, it seems that 
attentional resources automatically process irrelevant environmental information. In 
distractor-present trials with task set cues, this effect seems to be reduced and individuals 
were better able to focus the allocation of processing resources on the relevant hemifield, 
and as a result, reducing load on item processing. 
As in Experiment 3, the CDA amplitude dissociated from our behavioral results. We 
found no correlation between the electrophysiological reflection of unnecessary storage 
costs and our behavioral estimate of WM. Of course it might be the case that the 
behavioral improvements in WM performance after task set reactivation obtained in 
Experiments 3 and 4 do not reflect the extent to which targets are more efficiently 
encoded per se, producing less unnecessary storage of irrelevant items, but a result of 
more precise representation of the selected items. The higher the resolution of the 
memorized information, the easier is the later comparison process between the test item 
and the corresponding memory item at the test array. Such effects on comparison 
processes alone can in some cases explain behavioral WM capacity estimates (Alvarez & 
Cavanagh, 2004; Awh et al., 2007). Since the CDA amplitude is not sensitive to the 
precision of items being stored (Luria & Vogel, 2011), differences in item resolution 
could explain the dissociation between behavior and CDA of Experiments 3 and 4. 
However, we do not consider this a likely explanation. First, very recently it has been 
shown that cognitive control – the process which we have argued to underlie individual 
differences in WM capacity – did not affect the resolution of items in WM (Dowd, 
Kiyonaga, Beck, & Egner, 2015). Second, at the level of slow potentials we found 
evidence for improved attentional control due to increased efficiency in allocating 
attention away from information. In Experiment 4, for instance, we could show that the 
representation of the irrelevant hemifield in distractor-present trials was reduced after task 
set reactivation in the form of cues. It is therefore likely that the CDA is not a direct 
correlate or ’signature’ of memory storage (cf. also Postle, 2015) but a relative measure of 
the focusing and distribution of attention across the two hemifields which is related to but 
not identical to the number of stored items. Thus, instead of being constrained to focus on 
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the difference in activity between ipsilateral and contralateral hemisphere (CDA 
amplitude), one might think of the utility of slow waves as electrophysiological correlate 
of WM storage. For instance, Arend and Zimmer (2012) found amplitudes of slow waves 
at the contralateral hemisphere to be more closely related to behavioral data than the 
CDA. The general role of the CDA and what implications slow potentials have for WM 
memory research will be more deeply discussed in Chapter 11.4.1 and Chapter 12 of the 
general discussion. 
Finally, our results for the N1 component are consistent with the idea that individual 
differences in N1 modulation, as found in Experiment 3, reflect variations in the amount 
of cognitive resources left for distractor detection at the moment of target selection, rather 
than differences in early feature selection mechanisms per se (see Chapter 8.4). In 
Experiment 4 we observed no individual differences in sensory selection mechanisms, as 
the attenuation of the N1 component in the distractor-present condition was uncorrelated 
with WM capacity. Thus, in conditions of reduced cognitive load, high as well as low 
WM capacity individuals seemed to be able to allocate processing resources to relevant 
information. The manipulation of task set reactivation had no additional effect on this 
pattern. 
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10 Experiment 5: Testing the Influence of 
Reconfiguration Speed 
10.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 8 we argued that individual differences in WM capacity are associated with 
the efficiency of cognitive flexibility. One factor that overlaps with the ability to control 
the implementation of appropriate processes is the speed of this control process, and costs 
in dual-tasks have been proposed to reflect the speed of task set coordination (Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). For instance, it has been shown that providing participants with sufficient 
time to reconfigure the task set prior to target presentation reduced switching costs 
(Meiran, 1996), indicating that task set coordination takes time. In Experiment 2 of this 
dissertation project, we could further show that WM capacity is correlated with 
differences in the speed of this coordination process, with low WM capacity individuals 
needing more time to do so than high WM capacity individuals (see Chapter 6). Our 
major aim of Experiment 5 was to evaluate whether individuals with high or low WM 
capacity differ in the speed of coordinating changing task demands (cognitive flexibility). 
In order to do so, we implemented two different cue-to-target SOAs in a change detection 
paradigm with distractors, a short and long SOA respectively.  
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We used a modified version of the bilateral change detection task of Experiment 4 based 
on the procedure described by McNab and Klingberg (2008). In this task version, 
participants performed a change detection task with memory arrays consisting of yellow 
and pink rectangles. Cues, given prior the onset of the memory array, were symbolic 
(geometric forms) and indicated if the presented stimuli were target stimuli and should be 
remembered (target condition) or whether yellow (or pink) rectangles should be classified 
as distractors and be ignored (distractor condition). Thus, in this current version of the 
change detection task, compared to Experiments 3 and 4, the memory array alone was not 
indicative of the current task set, because it always contained yellow and pink stimuli. 
The current task set could only be identified based on the cue’s information. Thus, on any 
given trial the initiation of accurate processing steps needed to be implemented prior to 
the presentation of the-to-be memorized stimuli. As a consequence, all processes related 
to the identification and reconfiguration of appropriate task sets should be isolated from 
processes related to item selection. Critically, we manipulated the interval between cue 
display and memory array. We realized two different SOA, which, however, should be 
both long enough to evaluate the symbolic content (Wright & Ward, 1994). Thus, any 
time dependent effects related to differences in WM capacity could not be attributed to 
differences in the speed to classify the cue’s information, but only to the ability to 
reconfigure the appropriate task set in the given time. The shortest SOA we realized in 
our study was set to 400 ms and we contrasted this with a longer SOA of 1000 ms. We 
expected performance of low but not high WM capacity individuals to be influenced by 
SOA. Specifically, we expected low WM but not high WM participants to show a 
reduction in WM performance in distractor-present trials relative to pure-target trials with 
the same number of targets (unnecessary storage costs) within the short SOA, so that 
SOA should influence performance only for low WM participants. With the long SOA, 
performance for low WM capacity individuals should be as accurate as for high WM 
capacity individuals. For high WM capacity individuals, no unnecessary storage costs 
were expected. 
As in Experiments 3 and 4, on some of the trials cognitive control was contextually aided 
by task set cues in mixed blocks, or by single distractor blocks. Our hypotheses followed 
our previous results and the hypotheses of Experiment 3. For low but not high WM 
capacity individuals, we expected to observe unnecessary storage costs in trials without 
contextual support and no or reduced unnecessary storage costs in trials with contextual 
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support. Since participants with high WM capacity were not expected to show any 
unnecessary storage cots, we did not expect any additional effects on contextual support 
for high WM capacity individuals. We had no specific hypothesis concerning the 
influence of SOA for trials with contextual support. 
 
10.2 Methods 
Except as noted below, the orientation change detection task in Experiment 5 was 
identical to Experiment 4. Participants additionally completed a color change detection 
task. Half of the participants began with the orientation change detection task and half 
with the color change detection task. However, to make results of Experiment 5 
comparable to our findings of Experiments 3 and 4, all analyses are based on the 
orientation change detection task. Thus, the color change detection task will not be further 
reported. 
 
10.2.1 Participants 
Forty-eight Chinese volunteers (mean age: 22.71 years, range: 19-29, 24 female) 
participated in this experiment. They received 35 Yuan for their participation.  
 
10.2.2 Stimuli 
Cues subtended a visual angle of 1.17° and were presented in the center of the screen. As 
geometric forms, we used triangles and squares. The function of the cue was to indicate 
whether all items being displayed at the memory array should be remembered (pure target 
condition) or whether some of the stimuli needed to be ignored (distractor-present 
condition). The assignment of geometric shapes to pure target and distractor-present 
conditions was counterbalanced. As in our previous experiments, we implemented a task 
set cue for distractor-present trials in the mixed block. Here, the cue was presented in the 
target color on some of the trials. 
Memory items were identical to Experiment 4. Each memory item appeared on an 
imaginary circle with a radius of 3° around the center of the screen. At the test display 
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only one item appeared. This item was always displayed at the corresponding position of 
the tested memory item. 
 
10.2.3 Procedure 
The schematic of the experimental procedures is depicted in Figure 10.1. Responses were 
delivered via keyboards. Participants pressed one key to indicate a change and another 
key when test and memory item matched. The assignment of keys to this response 
categorization was counterbalanced across participants. Each session consisted of six 
blocks. Three of these blocks consisted of a random mixture of different set sizes (2T, 
2T2D, 4T), cue types (pure-target cue, distractor-present cue and task set cue) and SOAs 
(400 ms vs. 1000 ms), and three blocks only contained targets and distractors (2T2D) and 
different SOAs (400 ms vs. 1000 ms). In these single distractor-blocks, no task set cues 
were realized. Half of the participants started with mixed blocks and half began with 
single distractor blocks, and these were then alternated.  
 
 
Figure 10.1. Experimental paradigm of the distractor and pure-target condition in mixed block of 
Experiment 5. In this schematic a triangle indicated pure-target condition and squares distractor 
condition. The yellow square represents a task set condition. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, the participants completed a minimum of 24 practice 
trials. In total participants performed 360 trials with 36 trials per condition consisting of 
18 matching and nonmatching trials. Every 24 trials participants could take a short break. 
The procedure lasted about 45 minutes. In order to keep the motivation of the participants 
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high during the experimental procedure, participants received feedback after each break 
indicating their accuracy in the preceding block. 
We computed Kmax as described in chapter 2.3. To make results of Experiment 5 
comparable to previous studies only trials containing a short SOA were included. 
 
10.3 Results 
The mean WM capacity estimate was 2.69 (SD = 0.52) ranging from 1.56 to 3.76. 
Participants were divided into two groups by a median split, high capacity (M = 3.12, 
SD = 0.30) and low capacity (M = 2.32, SD = 0.35) individuals respectively. 
We first calculated a three way 3 (Set size: 2T, 2T2D, 4T) × 2 (SOA: 400 vs. 1000) × 2 
(WM Capacity: high vs. low) repeated measure analysis (ANOVA) with WM capacity as 
between subject factor to examine the effect of SOA on accuracy for the two WM 
capacity groups. For the same reasons as in Experiment 4 (see Chapter 9.3) we did not 
enter distractor-present trials containing task set cues or distractor-present trials of the 
single distractor block in this analysis. The ANOVA yielded a significant three-way 
interaction, F(2,92) = 5.18, p < .01. Figure 10.2 shows the PR-scores for each of the 
experimental conditions and both WM capacity groups. For low WM capacity 
individuals, the pattern of results was the predicted one. We observed reduced 
performance in the distractor-present condition relative to set size 2 on trials with short 
SOA, t(46) = 2.84, p < .001, indicating that individuals with low WM capacity were 
unnecessarily storing irrelevant information. At the longer SOA, however, performance in 
the distractor-present condition and set size 2 were identical, t < 1.00, suggesting 
influences of task set coordination speed on selective attention mechanism. Contrary to 
our expectations, individuals with high WM capacity also showed an analogous pattern of 
results to their low WM capacity counterparts. With short SOAs, WM performance 
declined in distractor-present trials compared to set size 2, t(46) = 2.24, p < .05, and with 
the longer SOA, no such decline in accuracy was found, t(46) = 1.10, p = .27.  
Next, we evaluated effects of contextual support on WM performance in distractor-
present trials. We calculated a three way 3(Contextual Support: no, task set cue, block) × 
SOA × WM capacity ANOVA. The interaction between contextual support and SOA 
approached significance, F(2,92) = 2.45 p = .09. No interaction including WM capacity 
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yielded significance. However, visual inspection of the pattern of results suggests a 
differential relationship. For individuals with high WM capacity performance in 
distractor-present trials seemed to have reached its limits in distractor-present trials with 
long SOA, so that contextual support did not have any additional impact on performance. 
By contrast, it seems that low WM capacity individuals gained an additional 
advantageous effect in trials with long SOA, and particularly in the single distractor-
present block. To further resolve effects of SOA and contextual support associated with 
WM capacity, we conducted follow-up t-test comparisons (two-tailed) for high and low 
WM capacity individuals separately. WM performance for participants with high WM 
capacity did not significantly improve at long SOAs independent of contextual support 
(all ts < 1.00). By contrast, for their low WM capacity counterparts we still found an 
improvement in performance at long SOAs (task set cue vs. no support, t(46) = 2.62, p = 
.01; block vs. no support t(46) = 4.06, p < .0001). 
 
 
Figure 10.2. Behavioral Results of Experiment 5. PR-Scores as a function of set size, 
contextual support and WMC, error bars represent plus minus one standard error of 
the mean. 
 
Overall, the results of Experiment 5 indicate that the magnitude of improvement in 
distractor-present trials was influenced by the size of unnecessary storage costs each 
individual showed. We quantified unnecessary storage costs as PR-Score of distractor-
present trials without contextual support minus PR-Score of set size two in trials with a 
short SOA. This estimate was correlated with different improvements in performance in 
terms of contextual support. Improvements in performance were calculated as the 
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difference between performance in distractor-present conditions for cue or block trials 
and distractor-present trials without contextual aid. Thus, positive values indicated 
facilitation effects. The results showed that the greater the unnecessary storage costs, the 
better the improvement from a short to a long SOA r(48) = -.47, p = .001, and the better 
the improvement after contextual support, as supported by two positive correlations 
between the amount of unnecessary storage in short SOA trials and the facilitation effect 
after either task set cues or blocked trials (r(48) = .54, p < .001; r(48) = .73, p < .001). 
 
10.4 Discussion 
The goal of Experiment 5 was to evaluate whether differences in speed of task set 
coordination are related to WM capacity and the unnecessary storage of irrelevant 
information. Specifically, we investigated whether prolonged reconfiguration processes 
account for unnecessary storage of irrelevant information for low WM capacity 
individuals. To assess this possibility, we conducted a modified change detection task 
which allowed us to disentangle task set reconfiguration processes and selection 
processes to a greater extent than Experiments 3 and 4. First, task instructions in form of 
cues indicated the task set validly prior to the onset of the memory items. Thus, processes 
related to the coordination of task components and encoding of relevant stimuli should 
not overlap. Second, we manipulated different SOAs to evaluate variations in speed of 
task set reconfiguration processes. 
The results we observed provided mixed evidence for our hypothesis that variations in 
speed of task set reconfiguration are of central importance in accounting for individual 
differences in WM capacity. Although we did find reduced unnecessary storage costs 
with a long interval between cue and memory array compared to trials with a short one, 
we found the analogous pattern of results for high and low WM capacity individuals, 
suggesting that individual variations in WM capacity are not correlated with differences 
in speed of task set reconfiguration processes. However, this idea contradicts previous 
findings showing no unnecessary storage costs for high WM capacity individuals using an 
identical task design (McNab & Klingberg, 2008). One possibility is that the observation 
of an identical pattern of results for high and low WM capacity individuals in Experiment 
5 is due to cultural differences between our sample and the ones reported in prior studies. 
There is recent evidence that indicates that individuals from Western and Asian cultures 
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differ in perceptual and attentional processes. While Westerners tend to focus attention on 
relevant objects independent of context, Asians tend to process stimulus displays more 
holistically. That is, they allocate attention in a context-dependent manner by attending to 
stimuli and their relation to the context as a whole rather than focusing on particular 
stimuli only. Furthermore, and more importantly, Asians also store target objects in 
relation to their context and even remember more about this context information than 
individuals from western cultures (for a review see Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005). Thus, if 
Asians are allocating attention differently than Westerners it seems likely that a 
distinction between high and low WM capacity based on remembering specific perceptual 
features is not as sharp as in our Western student populations of Experiments 1 to 4. 
However, to be sure that the results of Experiment 5 are indeed reflective of culture 
influences, we would need to repeat the same experiment within a western population and 
evaluate whether or not the pattern of results changes. An identical pattern of results in 
Western cultures would speak against cultural influences and against a correlation 
between WM capacity and speed of configuration processes. However, if, in contrast to 
our Experiment 5, low WM capacity individuals showed unnecessary storage costs with 
short SOA and high WM capacity individuals did not, our idea of cultural influences 
would be supported.  
The same argument of cultural influences might also account for the fact that in 
Experiment 5, we observed large declines in the size of unnecessary storage costs with 
contextual support, for both high and low WM capacity individuals. This result seems to 
contradict our previous findings of Experiments 3 and 4 showing no impacts of 
contextual support for high WM capacity individuals. However, true contradiction is only 
supported, if we do not accept the premise of cultural influence on our data of Experiment 
5. If we accept it, we would assume perception and memory to be context-dependent in 
this sample to a greater extent than in a Western sample. Thus, both WM groups would 
also store irrelevant but context-dependent information and improvements in performance 
after contextual support would be a function of the amount of irrelevant information 
stored, and this was what we found. 
 
Taken together, in Experiment 3 to 5 we found evidence consistent with the idea that 
variations in unnecessary storage costs – an indicator for optimal WM functioning – 
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might be reflective of variations in cognitive control abilities in general rather than 
selective attention mechanism per se. In Experiment 3 to 5 we observed that if cognitive 
flexibility and selective attention mechanisms are disentangled by allowing individuals to 
reconfigure the appropriate task set prior to the onset of the memory array, unnecessary 
storage costs for low WM capacity individuals were reduced. We could further show that 
cognitive control is sequentially organized and that for low WM capacity individuals the 
timing of selective attention mechanism seems to be a function of cognitive load. When 
cognitive load is high, resources for selection mechanism seem to be inefficient for early 
sensory mechanism (Experiment 3). By contrast, under conditions of low load, low WM 
capacity individuals were able to do so (Experiment 4). We further found variations in 
speed of cognitive flexibility to be correlated with the amount of unnecessary storage. 
However, due to possible cultural influences, the exact relationship between the speed of 
cognitive flexibility and variations in WM capacity (Experiment 5) remains uncertain. We 
proposed that further investigations should be undertaken to get a more elaborative 
understanding for this correlation. 
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Part 4 
General Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Interactions between Working Memory and 
Attention 
The main focus of this dissertation project was to disentangle causes of individual 
variations in visual WM capacity by taking a closer look at the interplay between 
selective attention and WM capacity. Models of WM emphasize the concept of 
maintenance of relevant information, whereas models of attention focus on the encoding 
of relevant information in the presence of irrelevant competing information. The 
definitions of both constructs are therefore closely intertwined. WM and selective 
attention are assumed to both enhance the processing of relevant in face of competing 
irrelevant information (cf. Ester, Vogel, & Awh, 2013). Some theories even suggest that 
selective attention and WM are essentially the same. These similarities are taken into 
account in models of WM that posit a central role for selective attention (Cowan et al., 
2005; Oberauer, 2013) and such models are supported by growing empirical evidence. 
In particular, a variety of studies have shown a tight relationship between WM capacity 
and the ability to control attention (Conway et al., 2001; Heitz & Engle, 2007; Hutchison, 
2011; Kane et al., 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003; Machizawa & Driver, 2011; Redick & 
Engle, 2006). Across all the different tasks used in the studies, individuals with low WM 
capacity were less efficient in controlling selective attention relative to their high WM 
capacity counterparts. In line with these studies, during the course of this thesis, we 
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repeatedly emphasized the importance of selective attention mechanism for optimal WM 
functioning. We have already highlighted that attention functions as a “gatekeeper” that 
determines which items will be maintained in the limited WM storage (see Chapter 4.3, 8, 
9, 10), indicating that only information that is attended can be stored in WM. Similarly, 
we assumed that reducing demands on processing resources in bilateral memory arrays 
can be achieved by controlling the allocation of attention onto the relevant hemifield (see 
Chapter 9.4). This has led to the straightforward conclusion that attention influences 
optimal WM functioning (see also Awh et al., 2006; Cowan, 2001; Engle et al., 1999). 
One aspect that is important in that regard is which subfunction of attention is necessary 
for gating information into WM. The general line of evidence presented in this work 
highlights the central role of the orienting and executive function of attention in 
explaining individual differences in WM capacity. While orienting describes the ability to 
select relevant information for privileged processing in face of competing but irrelevant 
sensory information, the executive attention function is assumed to resolve conflicts in 
information processing among competing mental processes, with low WM capacity 
individuals being relatively impaired in both processes (Experiments 1 to 2). In 
Experiments 3 to 5, we further observed that efficient gating – an indicator for optimal 
WM functioning – is assumed to require both processes, orienting and executive control 
respectively. 
Important in this respect is further, that although orienting and executive attention reflect 
different subfunctions of attention, they are nevertheless interrelated processes. This has 
been shown by Jolicœur and colleagues (Jolicœur, Sessa, Dell’Acqua, & Robitaille, 
2006a, 2006b). In two studies they used the N2pc – a component that is associated with 
selection of information for further encoding (Eimer, 1996; Luck & Hillyard, 1994). Its 
onset is about 200 ms post stimulus and the component is characterized by a more 
negative ongoing potential contralateral to the side of the target. In both studies, 
participants took part in an attentional blink paradigm (AB). The AB is a serial stream 
and involves the detection of two targets that are presented in rapid succession. Typically, 
accuracy in target detection is good. However, if the second target (T2) occurs within 200 
to 500 ms of the first target (T1) there is a large decline in accuracy of T2. This 
decrement is known as AB. Some theories propose that the AB is reflective of a goal-
driven process of attentional selection engaged by T1 that boosts the processing and 
encoding of relevant information and reduces the availability of attentional resources to 
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detect additional targets while T1 is being still processed (Olivers & Meeter, 2008). 
Jolicœur et al. (2006a, 2006b) used a modified version of the AB paradigm. They 
presented T1 in the center of the screen but T2 was lateralized to the left or right side of 
the display. Accuracy of report of T2 was lower when the temporal distance between T1 
and T2 was short, indicating an AB. Furthermore, and more importantly, they also found 
the N2pc to be reduced at short SOAs, indicating that while T1 was processed attention 
could not be oriented towards new information. This has been taken as evidence that 
orienting and executive control are mutually dependent processes. In our data, we also 
found evidence for interrelations between orienting and executive attention (see 14.2).  
In line with the taxonomy of orienting and executive attention, we will start our 
discussion of “attention” effects with regard to specific processing stages that are 
modulated by the orienting function of attention. 
 
11.1 Individual Variations in the Orienting Component 
Orienting attention to relevant information can occur at various stages of processing 
tapping into an age-old debate in attention research whether selection occurs at an ‘early’ 
sensory level or ‘late’ postperceptual level of processing or both (Broadbent, 1958; 
Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 
2005). According to early selection models, attention can influence processing at early 
sensory processing levels, prior to the full integration of different features into one object 
(Broadbent, 1958). Furthermore, and more importantly, it has been found that individuals 
can already suppress processing of distraction at this early stage (Hillyard et al., 1998; 
Mangun & Hillyard, 1991; Vogel & Luck, 2000). This has been taken as evidence that 
cognitive control can influence target selection already at early processing levels. Late 
selection models, by contrast, argue that all sensory information will be encoded and 
information is selected after different attributes are integrated into meaningful objects 
(Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). Electrophysiological evidence for late selection processes 
was provided by Vogel et al. (1998) using the AB paradigm introduced above. For T2, 
they observed no evidence for ERP components reflecting suppression of sensory 
processing (P1/N1) or processing of semantic content (the N400 component). However, 
at a late stage of processing before the information enters WM (the P3 component), 
complete suppression was revealed, suggesting that although T2 was processed, it was 
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never encoded into WM. It has now been established that attention operates at both stages 
of processing (Vogel, Woodman, et al., 2005), so that interactions between WM and 
attention can occur at various stages of processing and during the course of this thesis we 
repeatedly provided evidence for influences on both stages of processing. 
In Chapter 8 we reviewed that attentional modulation at perceptual processing stages 
translates to subsequent memory for those objects (for a similar discussion Gazzaley, 
2011). For instance, Zanto and Gazzaley (2009) found that variations in WM performance 
can be associated with early selection effects, with less efficient execution processes in 
low relative to high WM performance trials. Importantly, it could further be shown that 
the magnitude of such a selection process is correlated with successful WM performance 
(Rutman et al., 2010). Drawing upon these findings, it has been proposed that high but 
not low WM capacity individuals are able to suppress the influence of distraction at such 
an early stage of processing. However, based on the present study (Experiment 3 vs. 
Experiment 4) we believe that low WM capacity individuals are not necessarily slower to 
suppress sensory processing of irrelevant information. Instead, we argue that for low WM 
capacity individuals the execution of sensory item selection is dependent on the amount 
of cognitive load at the moment of item selection. Under conditions of high cognitive 
load, we observed evidence for distractor suppression at the N1 component for high but 
not for low WM capacity individuals (Experiment 3). After we reduced cognitive load, 
however, no individual differences involving WM capacity were found. High as well as 
low WM capacity individuals were able to inhibit the processing of irrelevant information 
(Experiment 4). Thus, the ability to utilize early selection processes seems to be a 
function of the availability of resources.  
We therefore propose that individuals with high and low WM capacity might differ in the 
ability to allocate cognitive resources. Thus, even when cognitive load is high 
(Experiment 3) individuals with high WM capacity would have had sufficient resources 
left to suppress processing of distractors. This interpretation is supported by recent 
evidence showing that an individual’s estimated WM capacity score (K-Score, see 
Chapter 2) in a color change detection task varies as a function of set size. In these 
studies, with set sizes exceeding the estimated WM capacity, the amount of information 
stored in WM decreased as indexed by a drop in the estimated behavioral score as well as 
a reduction in CDA amplitude. However, this was only true for individuals with low WM 
capacity (Fukuda et al., 2015; Linke et al., 2011). Note that the slot model (see Chapter 
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4.1) cannot account for this finding, because it predicts that the difference between high 
and low WM capacity individuals should remain the same once the number of items 
exceeds their capacity. However, if individuals with high and low WM capacity differ in 
the ability to control the allocation of resources we should observe precisely the reported 
pattern of the findings reported by Fukuda et al. (2015). Thus, when the number of items 
overloads the processing resources, individuals with high WM capacity seems to be able 
to use their full resource potential while individuals with low WM capacity are less 
efficient in doing so (cf. Fukuda et al., 2015). 
Differences in orienting attention to relevant target features (sensory selection) alone 
cannot account for variations in gating associated with WM capacity. During the 
processing of relevant information some conflict between relevant and irrelevant features 
might occur that needs to be resolved. According to models of attention, even less 
attended items might still be encoded if they contain relevant target features (Bundesen, 
1990; Olivers & Meeter, 2008; Wolfe, 1994). In Experiments 3 to 5, distractors and 
targets always shared relevant attributes, namely their orientation. Thus, distractors also 
might still have been processed to some extent. Although the N1 component was reduced 
in the distractor-present condition relative to set size five in Experiment 3 and set size 
three in Experiment 4, it was not identical to the N1 component elicited by pure-target 
trials with the same number of targets, supporting the idea that the distractors were also 
processed to some extent. Thus, optimal WM functioning might also depend on the 
ability to stop the processing of irrelevant information once it has been selected. This idea 
taps into postperceptual stages of encoding. In Chapter 5, we have already argued that one 
process of particular importance to stop the processing of stimuli within the focus of 
attention is the ability to disengage attention. Once objects are within the focus of 
attention, they gain advantages in information processing (Eriksen & James, 1986) while 
fewer processing resources are allocated outside the focus of attention (Handy et al., 
2001; Lavie, 1995). Thus, the less time attention dwells on a presented item, the lower is 
the probability that this item will be encoded into WM. In sum, variations in WM 
capacity may be reflective of differences in the ability to disengage attention form salient 
but irrelevant stimuli. Fukuda and Vogel (2011) tested this idea in a series of attention 
tasks. In their experiment 2, participants were required to report the orientation of a target 
Landolt C, as indicated by a preceding cue. The target stimulus always appeared together 
with a distractor. Shortly after the offset of the target array, task-irrelevant dots were 
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flashed either at the target or the distractor locations (dot probe array). On the other half 
of the trials, no dot probe occurred. The logic behind this procedure was that 
electrophysiological markers should show enhanced evoked responses at locations to 
which attention was allocated. As electrophysiological index for attentional selection the 
P1/N1 complex was used, components which are assumed to be sensitive to spatial 
attention (Luck & Hillyard, 1994). They examined P1/N1 attention effects to the probe 
array, which measured the ability to resist attentional capture from distractors, and they 
varied the SOAs between target and probe display to test for individual variations in the 
time needed to disengage attention. If disengaging attention takes time and individuals 
with high and low WM capacity differ in disengagement speed, the electrophysiological 
responses to targets and distractors should not only be a function of SOA but also be 
related to WM capacity. They observed that at the shortest SOA (50 ms) distractors 
captured attention for high and low WM capacity individuals, as indexed by an equal 
P1/N1 amplitude elicited by dots at target or distractor locations. However, while the 
P1/N1 measures suggested that at the longer 100 ms SOA attention of low WM capacity 
individuals was still captured by distractors, the focus of attention of high WM capacity 
individuals was employed only onto targets. Therefore, the individual’s ability to 
disengage attention may be a critical trait which determines WM capacity, and it steps in 
when distractors have already been selected for processing. Low WM capacity 
individuals seem to need more time to do so, and therefore distractors might be processed 
and unnecessarily represented in WM, competing with relevant items for storage space.  
Taken together, individual differences in the efficiency to orient attention on relevant 
information and to disengage attention once it has been captured seem to be an important 
factor when trying to explain variations in WM capacity. Apparently, the amount of 
cognitive resources at the moment of target selection determines at which stage of 
processing selective attention mechanisms for low WM capacity are efficient. 
 
11.2 The Influence of Executive Attention 
In the preceding paragraph, we argued that orienting attention can influence optimal WM 
functioning at a variety of processing stages. However, individual differences in focusing 
attention alone cannot explain the nature of individual differences in WM capacity. There 
has to be a central cognitive function responsible for ensuring that the dynamic control of 
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attention is indeed goal-driven. If the number of objects that can be stored at the same 
time is limited, efficient utilization of limited resources becomes even more critical. 
During the course of this thesis we repeatedly presented evidence consistent with the idea 
that such a general cognitive control mechanism is the process underlying individual 
differences in WM capacity. For instance, we showed that WM capacity was correlated 
with the efficiency of resolving conflicts between competing processes or changing task 
demands (Experiments 1 to 4). Such variations in cognitive flexibility were measured by 
individual differences in the flanker compatibility effect as assessed by the executive 
function of attention in the ANT (Experiment 1) and variations in the speed to engage the 
focus of attention on relevant information (Experiments 1 and 2). Each of these tasks was 
based on a competition between changing task requirements. If the task changed, the old 
task set was required to be suppressed and the new task set to be activated. We concluded 
that individuals with low WM capacity were less efficient in coordinating competing 
processes relative to individuals with high WM capacity. 
If we assume that WM encoding is a sequential process from initial sensory processing to 
item identification before information enters WM, the initiation of the accurate task set 
stands at the beginning of this causal chain. Thus, selective attention mechanisms are 
functionally integrated within task sets, and therefore are dependent on mechanisms of 
cognitive flexibility when multiple task sets need to be coordinated. As a consequence, 
the efficiency with which we select relevant information, and, as a result, the optimal use 
of limited WM resources, depends on the efficiency of cognitive flexibility. In this view, 
variations in cognitive flexibility account for variations in the optimal use of limited WM 
capacity. In Experiments 3 and 4, we tested this hypothesis (see Chapters 8 and 9). We 
observed that when cognitive flexibility was aided, by task set cues or single blocks, the 
amount of unnecessary storage cost was reduced compared to conditions with less 
contextual support (direction cues). Importantly, this was only the case for individuals 
with low WM capacity. Individuals with high WM capacity did not store irrelevant 
information regardless of whether cognitive control was aided or not. In order to quantify 
whether variations in WM capacity are not only reflective of the efficiency of cognitive 
flexibility, but also of the speed of this control process, Experiment 5 was conducted. 
Here, we systematically varied the interval between the cue display, indicating the 
appropriate task set, and the onset of the memory array which required the execution of 
selection mechanisms. With short SOAs, we found costs in WM performance in 
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distractor-present trials, indicating that the configuration of the appropriate task set was 
still ongoing as the processing of targets was already required. These costs were reduced 
or gone with a long SOA. Although we were not able to directly link this effect to WM 
capacity, possibly due to cultural influences (see Chapter 10), based on our results we 
believe that variations in the speed of cognitive flexibility influence optimal WM 
functioning. However, as argued in Chapter 10, a repetition of Experiment 5 within a 
Western sample would bring more clarity. 
Previous findings in the literature further support the idea that individual differences in 
WM capacity may be in part due to individual variations in the delayed initiation of 
selection processes. Fukuda and Vogel (2011) showed that individuals with low WM 
capacity are not more prone to a negative impact of irrelevant information, but that they 
need more time to disengage attention once it has been erroneously captured. Similarly, 
prolonging the exposure time for supra-capacity memory arrays systematically improves 
the estimated WM capacity for low WM capacity individuals compared with high WM 
capacity individuals (Fukuda et al., 2015). In these studies, people with low WM capacity 
were not less efficient in controlling attention per se, but needed more time to exert it. 
Based on our research, we are now able to extend these findings by highlighting the 
influence of individual differences in the ability to coordinate task set reconfiguration 
processes. High WM capacity individuals seem to be more efficient in coordinating 
different task set priorities. As a consequence, the initiation of specific processes which 
are associated with a certain task set has short delays and is highly effective. By contrast 
individuals with low WM capacity seem to be less efficient and/or slower in task set 
reconfiguration, prolonging the initiation of selection processes. If participants with low 
WM capacity are aided contextually to activate the task set in advance, such differences 
decline. 
 
11.2.1 The Interplay Executive and Selective Attention within Working 
Memory 
Since accurate performance in WM tasks is dependent on both selective attention and 
executive control, we believe that optimal use of limited WM resources is best reflected 
by variations in cognitive control in general rather than deficits in specific components. 
The question that remains is how WM theories account for the tight link between those 
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cognitive functions. In line with the time-based resource sharing model (TBRS), we will 
next develop the thesis that WM functioning can be best understood by assuming that one 
central system is responsible for mental processes associated with processing and 
maintenance of information, and that this system operates sequentially so that only one 
process can take place at a time (Barrouillet et al., 2007).We further postulate that such a 
central executive function is integrated within the framework of WM.  
The motivation to assume a single, central system is based on the consideration that 
multiple component models of WM that suggest a control mechanism that is structurally 
separate from WM (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Cowan, 1999; Engle et al., 1999; Norman 
& Shallice, 1986) have many drawbacks. For instance, such a system could be 
characterized as a homunculus (Baddeley, 1996; Miyake et al., 2000). The view of the 
nature of capacity limits in WM we propose here draws on single resources models that 
integrate an executive functioning within the framework of WM (Oberauer, 2013; 
Vandierendonck, 2012). Such models fractionate WM functioning into two parts. One 
module of WM is related to WM storage, whereas the other module involves an 
executive-related function. In the latter one, task set information is loaded. Since 
cognitive control processes are goal-driven, and thus, per definition, are functionally 
integrated within the task set, they are supposed to call on this executive-related function. 
Thus, tasks always tap into the executive function when the task set involves a specific 
component of cognitive control, such as selective attention. Important to note is that the 
modules for WM storage and executive function both suffer from limitations in the total 
amount of activation being available (Vandierendonck, 2012). If further both processes 
tap into the same resource, the allocation of limited resources to storage or executive 
function becomes crucial. In accordance with Carpenter and Just (1988), we suggest that 
variations in WM capacity in part reflect variations in the effectiveness with which 
limited resources are allocated to a given WM module, and high but not low WM 
capacity individuals would be efficient in doing so. Consequently, the optimal WM 
functioning for low WM capacity individuals might be achieved by telling individuals 
what process they should allocate resources to (Carpenter & Just, 1988). 
Based on the results that we obtained in Experiments 3 and 4 (Chapters 8 and 9), we 
further believe that individuals with high and low WM capacity also differ in the 
efficiency of allocating resources within a certain WM module. For instance, when a 
series of varying operations that load heavily on the executive component occupy 
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cognitive control, less time and resources are left not only for memory maintenance but 
also for encoding processes. If individuals with low WM capacity are generally less 
efficient in controlling the allocation of their limited cognitive resources, only few 
resources would be left for selection processes due to the sequential organization of the 
executive function, which in turn causes greater interference from distractors. We argued 
that the mixed trial structure of change detection tasks with distractors would be a suitable 
measure to test this idea. That is, change detection tasks with distractor-present trials 
require a high degree of flexibility for cognitive functioning. Individuals need to 
continuously switch back and forth between tasks where all items, or only a subset of 
items (distractor-present trials), are targets. However, because on most of the trials 
individuals are required to remember all items, performance costs due to task set 
coordination should be most evident in distractor-present trials. Important in our 
theoretical model is that the coordination of task requirements and selective attention both 
tap into the executive function of WM, but that due to the sequential organization the 
processing of distractors can only be stopped if the appropriate task set has been 
previously activated. If most cognitive resources are already consumed at the moment of 
item selection by task set specification, only few resources are left to stop distractor 
processing. Thus, the efficient allocation of processing resources seems to be important 
for accurate task performance. By aiding the executive functioning to select the correct 
task set in form of task set cues or single task blocks prior to the onset of the memory 
array, thereby reducing the amount of resources consumed by cognitive flexibility, we 
expected to improve optimal WM functioning for low WM capacity individuals. We 
found reduced unnecessary storage costs for low but not high WM capacity individuals in 
trials with contextual support relative to trials where cognitive control was less aided 
(Experiments 3 and 4 in Chapters 9 and 10). We further observed that for low WM 
capacity individuals the execution of selective attention mechanism may be related to the 
amount of cognitive load at the moment of target selection. If cognitive load was low, 
high and low WM capacity individuals were both able to selectively employ early sensory 
processing for target and not distractor features (Experiment 4). By contrast, if cognitive 
load was high, only high WM capacity individuals exhibited enhanced early sensory 
processing of relevant target features. We concluded that the organization within the 
executive function of WM is sequential and that our pattern of results is a function of a 
better availability of resources for low WM capacity individuals when target selection 
was required. 
 11 Interactions between Working Memory and Attention | 109 
 
 
 
11.3 Attention to Internal Locations within Working Memory 
Besides selective influences of attention before memory encoding, it has likewise been 
shown that attention can also be oriented to stimuli that are already maintained in WM 
(Awh, Dhaliwal, Christensen, & Matsukura, 2001; Downing, 2000; Duncan, 1984; 
Griffin & Nobre, 2003; Matsukura, Luck, & Vecera, 2007; Theeuwes, Kramer, & Irwin, 
2011; Van Moorselaar, Gunseli, Theeuwes, & Olivers, 2015). For instance, Griffin and 
Nobre (2003) found a significant cueing effect for cues that were presented with a time 
delay of 1.5-2.5 sec after the offset of the memory array in a color change detection task. 
In Experiment 2 from Griffin and Nobre (2003), participants were presented a memory 
array consisting of four colored Xs. After a delay period one test item appeared and 
participants responded to whether the color of the test item and the item presented at the 
corresponding location in the memory array matched. Importantly, informative pre-cues 
(before the presentation of the memory array) or retro-cues (after the offset of the 
memory array) indicated the location that would be probed with 80% validity. As a 
baseline, neutral trials (non-cued) were included. Compared to neutral trials, participants 
performed faster and more accurately on valid and even slower and less accurately on 
invalid trials. This pattern of results was equivalent for pre-cues and retro-cues. Thus, 
cueing an item during the delay period resulted in better WM performance compared to 
when an item was not cued indicating that attention can influence and enhance item 
representations that are already being maintained in WM. 
According to Matsukura et al. (2007), the beneficial effect of cues after the offset of the 
memory array is due to a protective selective attention mechanism. Since the cue is 
displayed after stimulus offset, no prioritization of perceptual processing can be 
accomplished. Selective attention mechanisms are assumed to protect the mnemonic 
representations against passive decay or inter-item interference. Van Moorselaar et al. 
(2015) further evaluated the dynamics of setting up this protection mechanism by 
systematically varying the time interval between cue onset and a visual mask in a memory 
task in a series of experiments. Recall performance was better on cue trials with and 
without a mask, suggesting that protection already operates during maintenance. 
Importantly, Van Moorselaar et al. (2015) showed that the protection mechanism is fully 
established at around 600 ms following the cue. Here, no interference effects on WM 
have been reported any longer. Further evidence, that setting up selective protection 
mechanisms requires time, has been observed by Pertzov, Bays, Joseph, and Husain 
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(2013). They used variable delays between retro-cues and memory probes and found 
significant effects of cues on WM performance if the delay was at least 300 ms. Together, 
the reviewed evidence suggest that attention towards internal representations can 
counteract effects of interference or decay. However, this protection mechanism takes 
time. 
 
11.4 Attention-based Rehearsal in Working Memory 
In the last section, we reviewed evidence that selective attention appears to affect 
information already stored in WM. Now, we focus on the cognitive mechanism by which 
this protection mechanism is achieved.  
Spatial attention plays an important role in many WM theories. Maintenance of 
information is assumed to be achieved via sustained allocation of attention towards 
mnemonic representations (Awh & Jonides, 2001; Postle, 2006; Zimmer, 2008). A large 
part of the theoretical underpinning of this idea was based on work of Smyth and Scholey 
(1994) suggesting that WM maintenance in the Corsi task (see Chapter 2.1) involves 
shifts of spatial attention. In Experiment 4, we also argued that enhancing the processing 
of a limited number of objects would be accomplished by attention on relevant items. In 
Chapter 4.3, we further emphasized that attended information gets a competitive 
advantage in contrast to unattended information (Duncan, 1981). These processing 
improvements might begin at early sensory levels and “[..] operate in the service of 
memory as well as perception, by providing a functional marker for location-specific 
representations in WM” (Awh & Jonides, 2001, p. 119). This idea was, for example, put 
forward by Awh and Jonides (2001), who affirm that sustained allocation of attention is a 
rehearsal mechanism for WM storage. Their theory is based on research showing typical 
effects of spatial attention such as improving visual processing efficiency for stored 
objects in WM (Awh et al., 1999; Awh, Jonides, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998). First, a clear 
overlap in brain regions elicited by spatial attention and memory processes were found 
(Awh, Smith, & Jonides, 1995). In order to learn more about the timing and spatial 
topography of spatial attention to memorized information, Awh, Anllo-Vento and 
Hillyard (2000) conducted a spatial WM task in which during the retention interval 
irrelevant probes were flashed either at the-to-be memorized location or at a different 
location. They observed that early ERP components were enhanced to probes appearing 
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at the same location as the mnemonic representation and were similar to those after an 
attention task using identical stimuli with no need to maintain those stimuli. Thirdly, such 
modulations of early sensory processing is elicited at visual areas contralateral to the 
attended locations beginning at about 100 ms after stimulus onset (e.g. Gratton, 1997), 
suggesting changes in processing efficiency at memorized locations . Fourthly, Awh et al. 
(1998) found that choice stimuli were responded to faster if they appeared at the same 
position that was currently stored in WM, indicating that attention was oriented towards 
this location. As main tasks participants were required to remember the location (see their 
experiment 1) or identity of a stimulus (see their experiment 2). During the retention 
interval a probe appeared either at the same or a different position and participants were 
required to press a button as fast as possible as soon as this probe stimulus appeared. In 
the spatial condition, participants responded faster to probes appearing at locations held in 
WM relative to irrelevant locations. However, no or little facilitation effects were found if 
the memory task was nonspatial (experiment 2). Finally, their experiment 3, Awh et al. 
(1998) showed that WM maintenance is impaired when an intervening task interrupted 
the allocation of attention to memorized locations. Participants were engaged in a spatial 
memory task in which they had to retain single locations. Crucially, a second color-
discrimination task was interleaved during the retention interval of the memory task. 
There were two conditions of the color-discrimination task. In one condition, the-to-be 
classified stimulus appeared at any position of the screen, and therefore required a shift of 
attention away from the memorized stimuli. In another condition, however, the presented 
color stimulus was large enough to include all potential memorized locations, and 
therefore the focus of attention could remain on the memorized location. WM 
performance was better, if no spatial shifts were required. Taken together, the evidence 
suggests that the maintenance of information is indeed achieved via sustained allocation 
of attention towards mnemonic representations. 
 
11.4.1 Does Attention-based Rehearsal Influences Performance in 
Change Detection Tasks? 
The need for participants to remember specific positions of objects in change detection 
tasks is often overlooked. For instance, in our version of the change detection task (e.g. 
Chapter 8) participants are instructed to report the orientation of only one object 
maintained in WM memory. Specifically, they were asked to judge whether the 
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memorized object corresponding to the location of the test item has changed or not. Thus, 
optimal WM performance depends crucially on the comparison process of the item 
features of the probed location with the remembered item features corresponding to a 
specific position. If this identification process is incorrect and the orientation of one of the 
non-probed items (i.e. those in different spatial locations) is retrieved, errors are more 
likely to occur emphasizing the role of memory for location for performance (see Bays, 
Catalao, & Husain, 2009 for a similiar discussion).  
This role has further been demonstrated by implementing a dot probe reaction time task 
within a visual memory task (Downing, 2000; Theeuwes et al., 2011). In one particular 
study conducted by Theeuwes et al. (2011) participants were required to maintain four 
colored squares. Memory was tested by asking participants whether a specific color was 
among the remembered objects, for example by the probe “red?”. After receiving this 
question, they were required to determine whether the color red was present in the array 
or not by making a simple yes or no answer. Critically, on some trials, a white probe 
appeared after the offset of the question “red?”. It was presented at one of the four 
locations with a certain probability that the probe dot location coincided with the location 
of the tested memory object. Participants were asked to give a speeded response to the 
probe. The results revealed faster reaction times to the probe when the location of the 
probe was identical with the position of the ‘retrieved’ memory item. These results 
converge with previous findings showing that WM performance is less accurate when the 
contextual information at the test array is different to the memory array (Jiang et al., 
2000) or the spatial configuration has changed (Zimmer & Lehnert, 2006), even when 
these features are completely irrelevant or when the names of the shapes rather than the 
actual shapes were displayed at the test array. Taken together, the results promote the idea 
that object identities are naturally integrated within spatial positions in WM. 
Interestingly, previous theoretical accounts confirm a central role of spatial attention for 
feature integration (see for a review Treisman et al., 1993). Remembering various objects 
with several features imposes a load on the system that is employed in order not to 
confound the different features at the moment of retrieval. One way to overcome this 
problem and avoid confusion would be to integrate the features in object files. According 
to Treisman and Zhang (2006) spatial attention plays an important role in doing so. Each 
object feature will be assigned to a specific position, and features belonging to the same 
position are bound into object files. Consequently, integrated object features are more 
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vulnerable to location changes than single features. If the spatial configuration is changed, 
the identification process of the corresponding memory array is disrupted, resulting in a 
mismatch between the presented and the remembered information (Bays et al., 2009; 
Jiang et al., 2000; Zimmer & Lehnert, 2006). 
We propose that the recruitment of spatial attention in the service of a rehearsal-based 
protection mechanism, as described in the preceding paragraph, is therefore also involved 
when performing change detection tasks. This is not trivial, especially because WM 
seems to encode the spatial properties of the stimuli it represents and combine it with 
perceptual information into one object file (e.g. Treisman & Zhang, 2006; Zimmer, 
2008). Thus, allocating spatial information to objects might play a special role in WM 
performance as assessed in change detection tasks, because participants need to remember 
locations of the memory items as long with their perceptual features as color, shape or 
orientation, even if they are not required to report changes in location. That is, in order to 
report changes in object features between the test array and the items held in memory, 
participants must determine a judgement for each memory item based on the comparison 
between the probe items’ locations and the retained locations of each memory item (Bays 
et al., 2009). Thus, subjects must have allocated their attention to the location of the 
memory items and applied a rehearsal-based attention mechanism for memory 
maintenance of both spatial and perceptual information. Now, we will discuss which role 
the CDA might play in this particular process. 
 
11.4.2 The Role of the CDA 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis we introduced the CDA as a valuable electrophysiological 
correlate for WM maintenance (e.g. McCollough et al., 2007; Vogel & Machizawa, 
2004). Its amplitude has not merely been shown to be sensitive to the amount of 
information being stored and individual differences in WM capacity (Vogel & 
Machizawa, 2004) but also seems to be a powerful tool to examine how attention control 
directs the encoding of information into WM (McCollough et al., 2007; Vogel, 
McCollough, et al., 2005). Based on these characteristics, we thought of CDA amplitude 
as a well suited electrophysiological reflection of WM functioning for our intended 
investigations. 
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However, in Experiments 3 and 4 we showed a clear discrepancy between behavioral 
performance and WM correlates. Although behavioral performance in distractor-present 
trials was clearly improved in trials where cognitive control was aided (task set cue, 
single block) relative to trials with less support (direction cues), CDA amplitudes in trials 
where cognitive control was aided was just as large as CDA amplitudes to sole direction 
cues. This discrepancy was unexpected based on the idea that both performance and CDA 
amplitude reflect WM maintenance. Of course it might be the case that the behavioral 
improvement in WM performance after task set reactivation was not due to better control 
of item selection producing less unnecessary storage of irrelevant items, but a result of a 
more precise representation of the selected items. However, for reasons explained in 
Chapter 9.4, we consider a resolution of WM representation an unlikely explanation of 
our behavioral findings. Instead, we postulate that the CDA is not a direct correlate or 
’signature’ of memory storage (cf. Postle, 2015) but a relative measure of the focusing 
and distribution of attention across objects which is related to but not identical to the 
number of stored items.  
The motivation to assume the CDA to be related to the efficiency of allocating attention is 
based on a growing amount of evidence. For instance, it has been shown that CDA 
amplitude in change detection trials is identical for objects that remain on the screen until 
memory is tested to those measured for stimuli that are no longer visible (Tsubomi, 
Fukuda, Watanabe, & Vogel, 2013). Awh, Anllo-Vento and Hillyard (2000) have further 
shown that sustained spatial attention towards the locations of the remembered objects 
influences maintenance of items in a spatial WM task. Thus, it is very plausible that CDA 
amplitude is sensitive to spatial properties of memory items. The organization of the 
visual system as well as the CDA are both contralateral in nature, further supporting this 
idea. Additionally, the CDA is in part generated in cortical areas that are at least partly 
associated with topographic mappings of location (McCollough et al., 2007).  
Although these patterns suggest that the CDA is associated with spatial attention, as 
described in Chapter 3.1 there is also evidence that the CDA could be dissociated from 
the number of locations that are relevant for the task (Ikkai et al., 2010), which is in 
apparent contrast to this idea. However, these results do not lead to the straightforward 
conclusion that CDA amplitude is indeed modulated by the number of objects. As argued 
in the preceding chapter most objects are compounds of multiple attributes and it is 
possible that individuals do not store complete object but single features. For instance, 
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Woodman and Vogel (2008) evaluated whether CDA amplitude is sensitive to item 
content. In their study, participants underwent a bilateral change detection ask with 
multifeature objects. Despite identical physical conditions between the color and 
orientation conditions, they observed larger CDA amplitudes for the latter condition. A 
critical aspect of their results was that the increase in amplitude for orientation and the 
number of items presented did not interact. Thus, the increase in amplitude from set size 
two to four items was identical for color and orientation indicating that the CDA reflects 
item content at least some extent (Perez & Vogel, 2011). However, what types of features 
are represented is still undetermined. Future research across a much broader range of 
different types of objects will be necessary to characterize the exact nature of CDA 
amplitude better. Nevertheless, we believe that one important feature that affects CDA 
amplitude in change detection task is item location.  
As we have discussed in the preceding Chapters (see Chapters 11.4 and 11.4.1) spatial 
attention also plays an important role during WM maintenance for complex objects. 
When attention is withdrawn, objects might fall apart into their various features (Wheeler 
& Treisman, 2002). This converges with Awh’s interpretation that spatial attention 
functions as a rehearsal mechanism to maintain information in an active state in WM 
(Awh & Jonides, 2001). We reason that the CDA is reflective of this rehearsal-like 
function of spatial attention over the delay period. It is assumed to code the integration of 
different features into an object file via sustained attention to their specific position. From 
this view, the integration of complex information should result in larger CDA amplitudes. 
Supporting evidence for this notion has been revealed by Woodman and Vogel (2008) 
who observed different CDA amplitudes as a function of the object feature being 
maintained. Further evidence that CDA amplitude might also encode spatial information 
was observed in multiple object tracking (MOT) tasks. In such tasks, individuals are 
required to track several marked objects on the screen. All other objects are irrelevant and 
should not be tracked. When the objects stop moving, participants have to indicate all the 
tracked objects. In such tasks, a similar CDA was found as in visual change detection 
tasks. Thus, adequate task performance requires selecting and sustaining the spatial 
location of the targets and the CDA seems to be reflective of this. With increasing number 
of targets being tracked, the amplitude of the CDA increased (Drew, Horowitz, & Vogel, 
2013; Drew, Horowitz, Wolfe, & Vogel, 2011; Drew & Vogel, 2008). Additionally, it has 
been shown that tracking the changing positions in MOT task produces larger CDA 
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amplitudes than those extracted from a color change detection task (Drew et al., 2011). 
Thus, CDA amplitude might be a relative measure of the focusing and distribution of 
attention across objects. This process is related to the maintenance of objects but not 
identical with it.  
However, this interpretation of CDA amplitude requires further research. One way of 
further investigating this might be to apply a study design that allows to further 
disentangle visual and spatial information. For instance, one might think of a similar 
change detection task as applied by Ikkai et al. (2010, see Chapter 3.1), but with different 
stimulus material. Instead of remembering color features, individuals could be asked to 
retain the orientation of stimuli or even maintain sounds. Specifically, four different 
sound could be serially displayed at different locations. However, two of the stimuli 
would always be displayed at the same location. Such a study design would allow 
distinguishing whether the CDA is reflective of the number of stimuli or the number of 
remembered locations.  
Instead of being constrained to measuring the CDA, one might think of the utility of slow 
waves (without applying the contralateral subtraction technique) as electrophysiological 
correlate of WM storage. In the next chapter we take a closer look at the slow potentials 
from which the CDA as a difference wave is calculated.  
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12 Reconsidering Slow Potentials 
An alternative approach to using CDA to evaluate WM functioning is the more direct 
investigation of slow potentials. The amplitude of posterior contralateral slow potentials 
has already in prior studies been shown to be reflective of WM maintenance (Arend & 
Zimmer, 2011; Liesefeld et al., 2014; Robitaille & Jolicoeur, 2006; Vogel & Machizawa, 
2004). However, as detailed in Chapter 2.4, one challenge for the interpretation of slow 
potentials is that numerous non-mnemonic processes (such as effort, arousal, task 
difficulty, etc.) may be reflected in their amplitude. These task-general processes may 
partly be responsible for larger amplitudes with increasing set size. Fortunately, Vogel 
and Machizawa (2004) have shown that such task-general processes do not affect 
lateralized slow potentials. 
Recently, the utility of slow potentials over CDA amplitude in understanding the nature 
of WM functioning have repeatedly been discussed in the literature. For instance, Arend 
and Zimmer (2012) found that the pattern of contralateral slow potentials better paralleled 
their behavioral accuracy data than the CDA pattern. Specifically, they found effects of 
maintenance as well as effects of item selection in both contralateral slow potential and 
accuracy patterns but not in the CDA pattern. They argued that contralateral slow 
potentials reflect other processes related to optimal WM functioning than CDA 
amplitude. However, further investigation is necessary to better understand the underlying 
causes of this dissociation. 
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One way of studying this is to take a closer look at ipsilateral potentials since the 
ipsilateral activity is used to control for unspecific contralateral activity when quantifying 
CDA amplitude (see Chapter 2.4). Interestingly, recent research also revealed a load-
depending modulation of ipsilateral potentials (Robitaille, Grimault, & Jolicœur, 2009). 
Theses amplitude modulations are exclusively caused by the processing of irrelevant 
items and are more likely when the number of irrelevant stimuli is small (Arend & 
Zimmer, 2011). More importantly, it has been shown that the influences of the number of 
items on ipsilateral slow potentials are related to variations in WM capacity, with load 
dependent influences being present only for low WM capacity individuals (Fukuda et al., 
2015). These results suggest that the allocation of attention towards the relevant hemifield 
and away from the irrelevant one is an important mechanism to ensure optimal WM 
functioning. The more processing resources are available for relevant objects, the more 
likely is their encoding into WM (Bundesen et al., 2005; Bundesen, 1990). The 
effectiveness of this process is influenced by selective attention (Hillyard et al., 1998), as 
we also showed in Experiment 4 (see Chapter 9). Here, we found reduced amplitudes at 
the ipsilateral hemisphere when the execution of reconfiguration processes was aided, 
with a larger reduction for individuals with low WM capacity. As reviewed above, if 
individuals are better in allocating attention on the relevant hemifield, fewer resources 
will be consumed for the processing of irrelevant information. 
Taken together, the utility of slow potentials in investigating WM processing has several 
benefits. First, contralateral slow potentials are not merely sensitive to the amount of 
information being stored but they do also reflect selection mechanisms relevant for 
optimal WM functioning. Second, by comparing activity patterns at ipsilateral and 
contralateral hemispheres we can learn more about differences in WM capacity associated 
with the ability to allocate attention on objects. Further investigations should be 
undertaken to get a more elaborative understanding of slow potentials. 
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13 Conclusion 
We have argued that individual differences in WM capacity are best understood by 
considering interactions between attention and WM. We found that a broad class of 
cognitive control processes contributes to this interaction. In the first part two 
experiments focused on a specific selective attention mechanism, namely the ability to 
allocate attention towards targets. We found that this process is more efficient and faster 
in individuals with high WM relative to low WM capacity individuals. We further 
showed that the magnitude of costs associated with deficits in voluntarily allocating 
attention is related to the ability to reconfigure the appropriate task set. Such 
reconfiguration processes take time and individuals with high and low WM capacity 
differ in speed of doing so, with low WM capacity individuals being slower. If the task 
set always remained the same, no individual variations associated with WM capacity 
were found. Thus, the ability to flexibly switch between changing task demands seems to 
be crucial for optimal WM functioning and individuals with high and low WM capacity 
differ in efficiency and speed of this process. 
In the following part of this thesis we further developed this idea by investigating 
individual differences in unnecessary storage costs that have been previously associated 
with differences in WM capacity. In a series of three experiments we observed that 
unnecessary storage costs in low WM capacity individuals are reduced if the initiation of 
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the appropriate task set was aided. This was achieved by a priori task set cues or single 
distractor-present blocks with no need for task set reconfiguration processes. The 
magnitude of this improvement was associated with the amount of available cognitive 
resources. We even went one step further and argued that the ability to utilize early 
selection processes is to be related to the total cognitive load at the moment when the 
selection process is executed. When the amount of cognitive load was reduced, 
individuals with low WM capacity were as efficient as high WM capacity individuals to 
ensure that only relevant items enter WM. On an electrophysiological level, this effect 
was reflected by early sensory suppression of irrelevant information. We reason that the 
same attentional processes are recruited for the active maintenance of information within 
WM as for visuo-spatial selection and that the CDA reflects this process. However, there 
are still some unresolved issues in this hypothesis that need to be resolved. We outlined 
one possible design for future research in order to do so. 
In sum, we were able to show a tight relationship between attention and working memory, 
which is associated with a broad class of cognitive processes, reflecting the diverse modes 
of operation within each of these systems. The amount of consumed processing resources 
and the ability to resolve conflict between competing processes seem to be important 
characteristics in this multifaceted relationship. 
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14 Appendix 
 
Table 14.1. Mean amplitude for ipsilateral and contralateral slow waves in a 
time window between 800 and 1000 ms for low WM capacity individuals from 
Experiment 3. 
 Set Size 
Hemisphere 2T 2T3D 5T 
Low WMC    
Ipsilateral -1.18 (.80) -1.36 (1.02) -1.13 (.91) 
Contralateral -1.73 (.75) -2.27 (1.10) -1.73 (.95) 
 
 
Table 14.2. Intercorrelations between three functions of attention from 
the ANT of Experiment 1. 
 Alerting Orienting Executive Control 
Alerting 1 -.05 .12 
Orienting -.05 1 .23+ 
Executive Control .12 .23+ 1 
Note. + p < .08 
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